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Moral evaluations of police and civilian use of force
At least 80% of law enforcement agencies in the United States rely on some form of a force
“continuum”, which is a scale that categorizes forceful actions systematically according to
their severity, and enables officers to make expeditious choices about appropriate respon-
sive force in real time. It is unclear, however, how much civilian evaluations align with or
diverge from such a severity scale. The studies in this dissertation derive precise severity es-
timates for a representative set of forceful actions that span the entire range of possibilities.
These scale values reveal that lay perceptions of police and civilian force substantively dif-
fer from formal models; non-lethal actions cluster together homogeneously, while actions
at the extremes are relatively spread out. Moreover, actions that are not role-normative for
police are perceived as especially morally severe, while more normative actions are less
morally severe. Participant ratings of morality and physical magnitude are also moderated
by participant beliefs about police legitimacy and other individual differences (e.g., race,
gender, political affiliation, etc.). Additional studies demonstrate that lay evaluators gener-
ally expect police to use less force than that with which they are confronted, even when they
are confronted with lethal force. This expectation is in direct conflict with the “one level
above” heuristic rule commonly used by law enforcement, and also with the supreme court
guidelines for evaluating when lethal police force is justified. Taken together, these results
imply that the groundwork for disagreement about the legitimacy of police and civilian ac-
tions may be partially rooted in the differential way that action severity is perceived by law
enforcement relative to civilian observers. They also offer insight into specific ways that
educational outreach and policy revision efforts can seek to better align lay and professional
moral evaluations force.
John K. Kruschke, Ph. D
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Policing in the United States has changed dramatically since the first publicly-funded
police agency was formed in Boston in 1838. Following President Hoover’s Wickersham
Commission in 1929, police agencies across the U.S. were driven (albeit slowly) toward
professionalization, and the goals of acting and being perceived as politically neutral or-
ganizations who imposed the rule of law fairly became increasingly prominent (Waxman,
2017). Alongside this general movement, law enforcement use of force procedures and
public expectations have evolved over the past century, and they continue to evolve into the
future as new technologies for applying force (e.g., tazers) and observing force (e.g., body
worn cameras) develop and become sufficiently cost effective to be broadly implemented.
As technology and culture expand and refine the abilities of police to more precisely apply
force in tandem with the abilities of the public to observe instances of applied force in high
fidelity, the importance of ensuring that the perspectives of police and the public regarding
what constitutes justifiable force relative to excessive force is increasingly acute (Boivin,
Gendron, Faubert, & Poulin, 2017; Culhane, Boman, & Schweitzer, 2016).
Despite this growing need to ensure that police and citizen evaluations of use of force
maximally converge, very little empirical research has investigated how lay individuals
evaluate police and civilian use of force in direct comparison to the procedures and rules
commonly used by law enforcement to categorize and select appropriate forceful actions
on the ground (Gerber & Jackson, 2017). Since the 1980s (Stetser, 2001, pp. 36-37), po-
lice in the U.S. and Canada (and many other western countries) have increasingly relied
on binning forceful actions into levels according to their severity. For example, low-level
actions such as the mere presence of police or polite verbal interactions are generally cat-
egorized at the lowest levels of severity, while high-level actions such as using a handgun
or rifle are classified at the highest severity levels. These classification structures are fre-
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quently referred to as a "force continuum" in law enforcement communities and policies.
Although there is considerable variety across agencies regarding the precise details of these
force continua, the basic structure remains similar and is used by the vast majority of law
enforcement agencies in the U.S. (Terrill, Paoline, III, & Ingram, 2011). Accompanying
these rank-ordered action bins, law enforcement agencies commonly use a heuristic rule
such as "officers can employ one level of force above civilian resistance" in order to fa-
cilitate expeditious decision-making and quick resolution of violent encounters. Despite
the ubiquity of this continuum schema among law enforcement, it is unclear whether lay
citizens use a similar structure to categorize the severity of actions, or whether their expec-
tations tend to agree with the "one above" heuristic or favor some other trend (e.g., using
equivalent or less force).
Thus, the primary goal of the research presented in this dissertation is to measure lay
perceptions of police and civilian use of force using representative actions that span the
entire range of force severity, and to assess the extent to which those lay perceptions are
similar to and/or different from the framework of formal force continua used by law en-
forcement. The bulk of this dissertation is comprised of three distinct but conceptually uni-
fied manuscripts that have been written in collaboration with my graduate advisor, Dr. John
K. Kruschke. The first and second manuscripts are presented in Chapters 2 and 3, respec-
tively, and they describe unique analyses of a novel experimental paradigm that combines
separate undergraduate and Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) samples. In Chapter 2 (i.e.,
manuscript 1), the analyses focus on precisely estimating the perceived latent moral and
physical severities of a representative set of officer and civilian actions that span the entire
range of continuum severity. This analysis yields intriguing comparisons with the contin-
uum framework and a novel psychometric scale. Chapter 3 (i.e., manuscript 2) focuses on
the ratings of morality and physical magnitude, and their interaction with participant be-
liefs regarding police legitimacy, as well as with one another. These findings shed light on
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how moral and physical magnitude judgments change according to different levels of offi-
cer and civilian action severity and different levels of legitimacy beliefs. Finally, Chapter
4 (i.e., manuscript 3) describes the results from several studies designed to measure which
actions lay evaluators select as the most appropriate officer responses to varied levels of
civilian resistance, as well as the extent to which the role-normativity of specific actions
corresponds to differential perceptions of moral relative and physical severity. These re-
sults provide insight into whether the perceptions of lay evaluations align or diverge from
the "one above" heuristic rule, as well as whether action normativity can partially explain
discrepancies in moral severity judgments.
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Chapter 2: Lay evaluations of police and civilian use of force: Action severity
estimates
Criminal violence is an unfortunate but perennial aspect of human behavior within soci-
eties. And until the root causes of criminal violence are fully understood and resolved, con-
trol and mitigation of criminal violence require some form of socially-sanctioned counter-
violence. But average citizens lack the ability and equipment to apply violence in a mea-
sured and precise manner, and even if citizens possessed the necessary skills and tools,
doing so requires that they expose themselves to elevated risk and eliminates the neutrality
of third-party intervention. Consequently, the bargain that citizens of modern democratic
societies make is to willingly cede the authority to use physical force to a ruling govern-
ment that exercises a moral monopoly on the use of violence (with limited exceptions for
immediate defense of self or others). In exchange, citizens gain the ability to call on spe-
cialized government agents to use force on their behalf for two primary purposes: (1) to
maintain law and social order (e.g., to effect arrests of resisting criminal suspects); and
(2) to provide skilled protection from other violent threats that exist in society (e.g., active
shooters, hostage takers, terrorists, etc.). Ultimately, the result of this social agreement is
a more peaceful and just society than one controlled by cyclical revenge and domination
by the largest, strongest, and most brutal (Pinker, 2011). Nevertheless, the tragic nature
of any use of violence demands that those who employ it professionally do so with max-
imum solemnity, care, and public accountability. The legitimate use of violence is one of
the most awesome powers democratic citizens give to their governments (Friedman, 2017),
and in modern societies, this responsibility is exclusively entrusted to commissioned law
enforcement officers by municipalities, states, and federal governments, at the behest of the
citizens they represent.
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Ordinal Levels of Force and Heuristics For Decision-Making
Across the United States (as of 2008), there are approximately 18, 000 state and mu-
nicipal police agencies, employing in excess of 750, 000 full-time law enforcement officers
(Reaves, 2011). In addition, there are at least 24 federal agencies that employ roughly
120, 000 full-time law enforcement officers (Reaves, 2012). At least 80% of those agen-
cies utilize a detailed list of rank-ordered force options (commonly referred to as a "force
continuum") as part of their official use-of-force policy (Terrill et al., 2011). These for-
mal classifications provide policy-level guidance for how the officers employed at a given
government agency are allowed to use force (Terrill et al., 2011).
Rank-ordered classifications of force are also utilized within the social scientific lit-
eratures, where police and civilian actions are sometimes separated into distinct lists of
role-specific categories. Researchers have used these lists to calculate the proportionality
of police use of force relative to civilian resistance by quantifying a mathematical difference
score, dubbed a "force factor" (Terrill, Alpert, Dunham, & Smith, 2003; Alpert & Dunham,
2004). An advantage of this method is that it explicitly quantifies the moral evaluation of
police and civilian violence (moral in the sense that it indicates whether force is insuffi-
cient, appropriate, or excessive), and there is evidence that such an algorithmic approach
can yield reasonable inter-rater reliability between two groups of evaluators (Hickman,
Atherley, Lowery, & Alpert, 2015). However, the core of the force factor approach requires
a clear and uncontested assignment of actions to categorical severity levels, which is a
condition that does not reflect the variety of actual law enforcement classification policies.
Moreover, the courts have explicitly ruled that evaluations of specific instances of police
use of force are so idiosyncratic that they must be evaluated individually with all relevant
facts and circumstances taken into account (Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 1979). Thus,
while strictly algorithmic approaches to the moral evaluation of force may be useful for
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researchers, they are insufficient tools for retrospective courtroom decision making. More-
over, the legal precedent the courts have set requiring legitimate police use of force to be
"objectively reasonable" (Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 3, 1989) is too ambiguous to be
useful for officers who must make prospective decisions in real time under time pressure
and threat.
Acknowledging that law enforcement agencies and researchers have approached force
classification and moral evaluation similarly due to the nature of use-of-force decision-
making, it is, nevertheless, unclear whether lay people making evaluations of force are
framing force in terms of a sequence of categories (like police) or doing anything resem-
bling a force-factor calculation (like researchers). Even among professionals, there is vari-
ation in the precise structure of use-of-force policies. There is no absolute consensus be-
tween law enforcement agencies regarding a uniformly accepted list of rank-ordered force
options, and policies can differ in terms of the exact placement of some actions (Terrill
et al., 2011). For example, conducted energy devices (e.g., tazers) are placed below hard
empty hand techniques (e.g., punches or kicks) by some agencies, but the order is reversed
by other agencies. Additionally, the number of rank-ordered categories contained within a
given use-of-force policy varies between 3 and 9 levels, depending on the law enforcement
agency (Terrill et al., 2011). Still, nearly three quarters of all law enforcement agencies
use a 5 or 6 level classification (Terrill et al., 2011), and many researchers (Terrill et al.,
2003) recommend a six-category list for evaluation of police use of force and civilian re-
sistance. Thus, despite the existence of minor variations, most use-of-force policies exhibit
a very similar structure and categorization scheme that is mirrored in research paradigms.
Therefore, the current study utilized a six-category list which is depicted in Table 1 and
described more completely in the method section. As noted above, it is common parlance
among law enforcement professionals and in the criminal justice literature to refer to these
force option lists as a "force continuum," but in actuality they are ordered categories that
6
Table 1
Six ordinal levels of force (SOLOF) scale.
Level Description
1 Cooperation, physical proximity, polite dialogue.
2 Strong verbal interaction.
3 Open hand control, defensive resistance, non-deadly weapon use
with minimal injury potential.
4 Closed hand techniques.
5 Intermediate or aggravated force, non-deadly weapon used with
moderate injury potential.
6 Deadly force.
do not contain information about the distance between levels of force nor about differences
within categories. For the purposes of the current research, we refer to this list as the six
ordinal levels of force (SOLOF) scale.
Law enforcement agencies routinely use a SOLOF-style scale in combination with a
heuristic rule to train their officers to quickly identify appropriate levels of responsive force
(Garner, Schade, Hepburn, & Buchanan, 1995; Terrill & Paoline, 2013), though it is worth
noting that there is considerably less inter-agency consensus about these rules than about
the SOLOF-scale itself (Terrill et al., 2011). For example, a policy might dictate that of-
ficers are allowed to be one level of force above a resisting civilian in order to maintain
control and to minimize the duration of the encounter, as well as to reduce the potential for
officer and civilian injury that could result from an extended interaction (e.g., if a civilian
punches an officer, an agency might authorize the officer to respond by striking the civilian
with a collapsible baton rather than engaging in a protracted punch-for-punch exchange).
By memorizing their agency’s SOLOF scale and heuristic rule, officers can presumably
make consistent choices about the most appropriate level of force to use in real-time en-
counters with resisting civilians. This strategy is especially useful for professional law en-
forcement officers who can converse with colleagues about hypothetical situations (a.k.a.
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"if-then dialogues") and thereby enhance intra-agency consistency.
One problem with the formal SOLOF measure endorsed by Terrill et al. (2003), how-
ever, is that it contains ambiguous categories. For example, it is unclear what distinguishes
"active resistance" from "aggravated active resistance." Consequently, there is room for dis-
agreement regarding which SOLOF category best accommodates a specific forceful action.
It is possible that the widespread conflict surrounding police use of force that is observable
in the current national discourse is rooted in this sort of disagreement about action binning,
and it is also possible that utilizing a SOLOF list and heuristic rule are largely unrepresen-
tative of what lay people are actually doing when they make moral judgments about use of
force. Because there is so little systematic research investigating lay evaluations of specific
forceful actions, the extent to which civilians utilize something like a SOLOF-style list and
heuristic rule is currently unknown.
Recent Criticism and Disparate Evaluations of Force
Because of the delegation of legitimate use of violence to law enforcement agencies,
police use of force in the United States is perennially under scrutiny. In recent years,
police use of force has been heavily criticized (Friedersdorf, 2015, 2017b). Videos of
deadly force involving police and minorities have been prominent in the national news
(Handelman, 2014), and harsh criticism of police has consequently proliferated (Coates,
2015). Some of this criticism is clearly warranted and is valuable as a catalyst for reforming
unjust or insufficiently skilled practices; law enforcement agents are rightly held to a high
standard of excellence, especially when employing violence (Selby, 2016). However, some
argue that a disproportionate amount of police violence in the media has resulted in public
perceptions that the use of force by police is a common occurrence (Sullivan, 2017) when
it is actually quite rare relative to the total number of police-citizen encounters (Hyland,
Langton, & Davis, 2015; Lemoine, 2017). Moreover, a careful examination of the rhetoric
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(both anti-law enforcement and pro-law enforcement) in dialogues about police use of force
reveals a regular disconnection from the facts of particular cases, and an unwillingness to
wade into the full nuance of the details (Loury, 2015; McWhorter, 2016). Because police
use of force is such a highly moralized topic, it is especially vulnerable to ideological
distortions, extreme levels of conviction, and confirmation biases that influence the way it is
evaluated. In general, moralized attitudes have unique characteristics that include increased
intolerance of others with dissimilar views, reduced cooperation, and an inhibited ability
to resolve disagreements (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). So, to the extent that moral
polarization surrounding police and civilian violence is increasing, third-party observers
on opposite sides are prone to oversimplify in favor of their prior moral mandates despite
the complexity and nuanced details that are frequently present at the level of individual
use-of-force cases.
There are many ways to parse instances of police use of force. For example, observa-
tional and experimental researchers have routinely used dichotomous (e.g., "reasonable" vs.
"excessive") or trichotomous (e.g., "no force," "necessary force," "improper force") cate-
gories as measurement tools (Worden, 2015; Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002). In other domains,
it has been argued that police use of force can be rationally divided into categories that in-
clude (1) excessive: cases of egregious, unlawful abuse of authority, (2) negligent: cases
of unintentional/non-malicious officer overreaction, often coupled with a lack of sufficient
training, and (3) necessary: cases in which law enforcement actions yield tragic outcomes
but are, nevertheless, appropriate (Harris & Loury, 2016). Notice that each of these various
categorization strategies decomposes use of force in moral terms (i.e., in terms of perceived
right and wrong) rather than in more descriptive/objective terms like raw physical severity,
potential to cause injury, etc. In other words, although at face value it seems like ques-
tions such as "how many times did police in the U.S. use excessive force in the past year?"
are fact-based questions demanding a precise numeric answer, in reality they are value-
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driven questions that implicitly require binning complex sets of facts into sharply divided
and mutually exclusive moral categories (Balko, 2016). This sort of categorization process
presupposes a particular set of shared values and experiences (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek,
2009; Haidt, 2012; Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015). In ambiguous cases, whether
or not an individual judges an officer to have acted, for example, "too quickly" or "at the
appropriate moment," likely depends, in part, on many individual differences including the
evaluator’s political leaning, gender, personal and vicarious experiences with officers, race,
ethnicity, etc. As a result, for many of the cases of police violence recently highlighted by
the media, there is widespread social disagreement about whether the details of that par-
ticular event belong in the "necessary" or "excessive" bin; people watching the same video
or reading the same set of facts seem to be coming to starkly different moral conclusions
(Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, 2009; Pew, 2014).
Parsing the extent to which these disparate evaluations are driven by individual differ-
ences or by the actions themselves is a challenging but important goal. To the extent that
a society values improving trust between citizens and police, and increasing police effi-
cacy and perceived legitimacy (goals that are worth pursuing, Tyler, 2004; Tyler, Goff, &
MacCoun, 2015), it is crucial to develop a clear and detailed empirical understanding of
how third-party observers make moral evaluations of use of force, and the ways in which
their perceptions align or differ from one another. Despite this pressing need, experimental
research into third-party evaluations of use of force is limited in both quantity and scope.
Previous Research on Moral Evaluations of Use Of Force
A variety of previous research has investigated different aspects of police use of force.
For example, one body of work has focused on describing the actual rates and correlates
of use of force that exist in U.S. policing (Klinger, 1995; Fryer Jr., 2016). These studies
analyze real-world data sets (i.e., reports of actual use-of-force incidents) that are usually
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sampled from one or a small number of police agencies, and they often model relation-
ships between a selection of independent variables (e.g., policing style, agency culture,
officer/suspect race, etc.) and rates of "excessive" force. Other research has investigated
general public attitudes toward police use of force using a variety of large-scale methods.
Some studies make inquiries about first-person experiences (e.g., the Police-Public Contact
Survey, Eith & Durose, 2011), while others rely on a small subset of questions extracted
from routinely collected, non-specific datasets such as the general social survey (D. John-
son & Kuhns, 2009; Silver & Pickett, 2015). While all of these studies are scientifically
valuable, they do not speak directly to how observers make moral evaluations of use of
force, or how observers perceive the severity of specific forceful actions.
In another corpus of research using experimental paradigms, participants have been
presented with forceful actions that are divided, a priori, into justified and unjustified cat-
egories (Bradford, Milani, & Jackson, 2016; Gerber & Jackson, 2017). These studies tend
to model associations between ratings of acceptability and individual-difference measures.
One variant of these studies restricts the focus to evaluations of deadly force exclusively
(Fridell & Binder, 1992; Skinner & Haas, 2016). Such an approach is useful for under-
standing deadly force but is unlikely to generalize to all levels of force, in part because
deadly force is extreme and rare (as rare as a person being struck by lightning, Eith &
Durose, 2011; Lemoine, 2017)). Other experimental research in psychology has used time-
restricted decision-making tasks (e.g., the "shooter task"), but these studies have almost
exclusively focused on biases by police and civilians in the application of force (Correll et
al., 2007; Hall, Hall, Perry, & Hall, 2016) rather than on moral evaluations of force from
the perspective of lay observers.
All of these previous approaches were driven by top-down strategies that assumed stim-
uli reflect a moral consensus about the reasonableness or excessiveness of a particular force-
ful action, for example, that if a civilian is armed then lethal force is acceptable but if the
11
civilian is unarmed then lethal force is excessive (Nix, Campbell, Byers, & Alpert, 2017).
However, this method of dividing up force evaluations is likely to be misaligned with the
nuance and complexities of real assessment (Klinger & Slocum, 2017). As far as we are
aware, none of the studies in the relevant literature has systematically measured percep-
tions of representative actions across the entire spectrum of possibilities. Because official
classifications of forceful actions have a rank-ordered structure, and heuristic rules place
legitimate actions relative to other actions within that structure, it is important to assess
how lay perceptions of specific actions across the entire range of force severity do or do not
align with law enforcement classifications.
Thus, our primary focus for the current research was estimating the underlying moral
and physical severity of a wide variety of representative forceful actions in order to gen-
erate an emblematic set of psychometric scale values. These scales enable subsequent
comparisons between lay evaluations and the structure of SOLOF models. They also pro-
vide a rigorous foundation that makes it possible for future research to ask questions about
the general level of severity lay evaluators expect police to use, and, thus, they generate a
framework for evaluating common heuristic rules used by police and comparing them to
lay expectations.
The Need For Scale Values For Representative Forceful Actions
To measure whether lay force evaluations resemble a SOLOF-style scale, and whether
lay evaluations agree with a heuristic such as "officers can use force that is one level above
civilian resistance," it is important to know the perceived severity of a wide range of rep-
resentative forceful actions. Such baseline knowledge is required because these heuristics
are, by nature, relative references to other possible actions. To know that people gener-
ally expect officer force to be above civilian force (or below or equivalent to), one must
know where a wide range of actions are located in terms of their perceived severity. It
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cannot merely be presumed that actions officially categorized at a given SOLOF level are,
in fact, perceived by lay evaluators the same way. Thus, if we want to know whether the
underlying general tendency of lay evaluators judging a specific action sequence matches
or diverges from a particular law enforcement heuristic, we must first have detailed knowl-
edge about the precise perceived severity of the actions in question and a sufficient number
of surrounding actions with which to make relative comparisons.
The underlying severity inherent in any given action has at least two components: a
raw physical component that reflects descriptive severity, and a moral component that is
overtly prescriptive. These components roughly correspond to David Hume’s famous is-
ought distinction (Hume, 1738/2003) in that the descriptive component reflects how much
force there is, while the prescriptive component reflects how much force there ought to be.
For this reason, in the current study, we estimated psychometric scale values for a wide
range of forceful actions using both descriptive and prescriptive dimensions.
As explained in detail below, we presented participants with minimal vignettes de-
scribing an officer and civilian encounter that involved one officer action and one civilian
action. The actions in these paired vignettes spanned the complete range of force options.
Participants rated the officer and civilian actions on moral dimensions (i.e., acceptability,
appropriateness, and punishability of the action) and a physical dimension (i.e., how much
force). These ratings were used to derive underlying moral and physical scale values for
each action.
Method
All of the experiments presented in this article were approved by the Indiana University
Institutional Review Board in Bloomington, Indiana.
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Participants
To obtain a diverse sample, we collected data from both the Indiana University (IU)
undergraduate subject pool and Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). To verify that the two
different subject pools did not differ in their ratings, we gathered reasonably large samples
from IU and MTurk and conducted the analysis described below separately for each sample.
Results showed virtually identical model descriptions, and therefore we combined the sam-
ples together in order to increase the precision of the estimates. Separate analyses for IU
and MTurk subject pools are available in the supplementary material (https://osf.io/h6jg3).
A total of 411 participants were recruited through MTurk and 395 participants were
recruited through the IU undergraduate subject pool. Each participant was presented with
a consent form explaining the procedure for the study and the participation requirements,
which included being a current resident of the United States, at least 18 years old, and a
fluent speaker of the English language. Thirty eight participants were excluded from the
MTurk sample for failing to participate from within the US (as verified by IP address geolo-
cation), and 23 were additionally excluded because they failed more than one of the random
manipulation checks or because the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of their ratings for the
entire experiment exceeded 3 standard deviations below the MAD for all MTurk partic-
ipants (i.e., their responses hardly varied across questions or items, suggesting they may
have left the response slider at its default level for most trials). Participation within the
US was guaranteed with the IU sample, but 78 participants were excluded for failure of
more than one manipulation check or if the MAD exceeded 3 standard deviations below
the MAD for all IU participants. This yielded a total of 350 MTurk participants and 317 IU
participants, for a combined total of 667 participants.
Of the included three hundred and fifty MTurk participants, 196 (56%) identified as fe-
male, 152 (43.4%) identified as male, and 2 (0.6%) identified as other. 2 (0.6%) identified
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as American Indian/Alaska Native, 23 (6.6%) identified as Asian, 27 (7.7%) identified as
Black or African American, 20 (5.7%) identified as Hispanic or Latino, 269 (76.9%) iden-
tified as White, 8 (2.3%) identified as More than one, and 1 (0.3%) identified as Unknown.
Of the included three hundred and seventeen IU participants, 208 (65.6%) identified as
female, 109 (34.4%) identified as male, and 0 (0%) identified as other. 1 (0.3%) identified
as American Indian/Alaska Native, 48 (15.1%) identified as Asian, 27 (8.5%) identified
as Black or African American, 12 (3.8%) identified as Hispanic or Latino, 217 (68.5%)
identified as White, 11 (3.5%) identified as More than one, and 1 (0.3%) identified as
Unknown.
Stimuli
Set of actions. We began by crafting a role-neutral SOLOF scale that combined
Terrill et al. (2003)’s suspect resistance levels and officer force levels (see Figure 1). Using
this unified SOLOF scale, we generated a large list of actions (approximately 100) that
could plausibly, or at least possibly, be committed by both an officer and a civilian, being
sure to include multiple actions that rationally fit into each of the six SOLOF levels. It is
worth noting that this initial list was generated loosely in the sense that it functioned as an
initial brainstorm of options and as a mechanism to automatically exclude any obviously
implausible actions. Importantly, the initial list did not attempt to generate a set of actions
that are equally plausible for both an officer and a civilian because generating such a list
is likely to be impossible; in the context of a police-civilian interaction, some actions are
intrinsically more associated with police (e.g., handcuffing), and the same is true for other
actions that are probably more associated with civilians (e.g., calling the other person a
"pig" or pulling away).
After composing this larger list, we set out to narrow it down to a more manageable
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SOLOF 
Level
Action Statement Action Name
1
the [officer/civilian] stood near the [civilian/officer] stoodNear
the [officer/civilian] asked the [civilian/officer] how he was doing asked
the [officer/civilian] waved at the [civilian/officer] in greeting waved
2
the [officer/civilian] yelled “get back” at the [civilian/officer] getBack
the [officer/civilian] shouted “get your fucking hands up!” / “I don't have to 
fucking listen to you!” at the [civilian/officer]
handsUp/ 
dontListen
the [officer/civilian] said “if you touch me, you're gonna get hurt” to the 
[civilian/officer]
hurtThreat
the [officer/civilian] called the [civilian/officer] a “thug” / “pig” nameCall
3
the [officer/civilian] put handcuffs on/pulled away from the [civilian/officer]
handcuff/ 
pullAway
the [officer/civilian] sprayed the [civilian/officer] with pepper spray pepperSpray
the [officer/civilian] shocked the [civilian/officer] with a tazer tazer
the [officer/civilian] twisted the arm of the [civilian/officer], forcing him to the 
ground
armbar
4
the [officer/civilian] punched the [civilian/officer] in the face punchFace
the [officer/civilian] kicked the [civilian/officer] in the stomach kickStom
the [officer/civilian] applied a chokehold to the [civilian/officer] choke
the [officer/civilian] headbutted the [civilian/officer] in the face headbutt
5
the [officer/civilian] struck the [civilian/officer] on the leg with a collapsible 
baton/metal pipe
batonLeg/ 
metalPipe
the [officer/civilian] shot/struck the [civilian/officer] in the chest with a beanbag 
shotgun round/baseball bat
beanbag/ 
ballBat
the [officer/civilian] struck the [civilian/officer] in the stomach with a metal 
flashlight
flashlight
6
the [officer/civilian] shot the [civilian/officer] in the chest with a handgun handgunChest
the [officer/civilian] shot the [civilian/officer] in the head with a handgun handgunHead
the [officer/civilian] struck the [civilian/officer] with a motor vehicle vehicle
the [officer/civilian] slammed the [civilian/officer]'s head into the concrete curb headSlam
Figure 1. All 22 actions are listed in the middle column, with their SOLOF level in the left
column and abbreviated name in the right column. Colors indicate the SOLOF level, and
will be used in subsequent graphs.
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set of 22 actions per role while retaining at least three actions in each of the six SOLOF
categories. The first thing we observed was that, although we were able to generate a large
number of actions, there seemed to be a reasonably small core set of violent actions that
can plausibly occur within a dyadic pair. Beyond the core set, additional actions are most
readily generated by specifying severity modifiers such as the target of the action or the
number of times an action occurred. For example, an officer could kick a civilian in the
face, stomach, leg, etc., and could do so once or more than once. We immediately elim-
inated actions that occurred more than once in order to avoid the confound of comparing
multiple actions (e.g., punching repeatedly) with one action. To deal with action target, we
initially tried to specify actions in their most generic form (e.g., the civilian punched the of-
ficer), but realized that target clearly matters for judgments of action severity (e.g., kicking
someone in the head versus kicking them in the hip), and that leaving the target ambigu-
ous would likely increase participant confusion and decrease measurement precision (e.g.,
some participants might infer a default target if left unspecified). For that reason, we chose
to specify action target (e.g., the civilian punched the officer in the face) in all cases except
those in which the target was obvious (e.g., handcuffing) or seemed largely irrelevant. This
target specification is congruent with law enforcement training procedures that incorporate
target into judgments of force severity for intermediate severity levels (Jenkinson, Neeson,
& Bleetman, 2006).
To further hone the set of experimental actions, we considered selecting officer actions
according to their actual frequency of use, but there are several problems with that ap-
proach. First, police in the United States only use force in about 1-2% of all police-citizen
encounters, so it is a relatively rare occurrence overall. Secondly, the distribution of force
severity among those 1-2% of encounters is heavily skewed because most police use of
force is comprised of low severity actions (Hyland et al., 2015; Davis, Whyde, & Langton,
2018). As a result, selecting actions according to how commonly they are used by police
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in the field does not yield a set of actions that include representative options across the full
spectrum of severity; instead, such an approach would produce many actions at low levels
of severity and few or no actions at high levels of severity. Because we are attempting
to map actions across the entire range of severity, selecting actions based on their raw or
proportional frequency of use was not appropriate.
With all of these considerations in mind, we ultimately selected actions that were
broadly distributed across all severity levels, that we believed were widely representative
of real-life force options, and that also reflected within-category variety and maximal role-
plausibility. Specifically, we first chose officer actions that are in common use among law
enforcement agencies and frequently appear on the majority of use-of-force policies and in
police training materials in the U.S. (Terrill et al., 2011). For example, it is standard prac-
tice at most police agencies to issue collapsible metal batons to officers for use as impact
weapons (although some agencies distribute other impact weapons such as nunchucks or
PR-24 rigid batons, collapsible batons are issued by the majority of modern law enforce-
ment agencies because of their compact size that facilitates ease of carry without signif-
icantly reducing efficacy). It is worth noting that, prior to conducting this research, the
first author (BDC) spent more than a decade as a commissioned law enforcement officer
at municipal and federal levels. During a majority of that time, he functioned as a use-of-
force instructor for a joint set of law enforcement agencies, as a subject matter expert on
police use of force, and as a member of internal review boards evaluating the legality of
specific instances of force application in the field. Thus, our action selection process was
also informed by his prior experience and expertise.
Seventeen of the officer actions we chose could also be plausibly performed by a civil-
ian. However, five of the 22 selected actions differed between the officer and the civilian.
For example, one of the officer actions at level 5 of the SOLOF indicates that "the offi-
cer shot the civilian in the chest with a beanbag shotgun round." Because it is implausible
18
that any civilian would have access to such a specialized weapon, we matched this offi-
cer action with "the civilian hit the officer in the chest with a baseball bat," which makes
the action more plausible for a civilian but is reasonably balanced with the general level
of force caused by a beanbag shotgun round. We retained these five actions because we
wanted to maximize diversity of action within each SOLOF severity level. For a full list
of all actions, including the five actions that differ between officer and civilian, please see
Figure 7.
Because there were five unique civilian actions matched with five other officer actions,
the total number of unique actions was 27. Nevertheless, to avoid confusion and to reinforce
that these five actions were matched across roles, we refer to the full set of "22 actions"
throughout this article. Importantly, although we tried to match the five differing actions a
priori in terms of severity, it is not crucial to the experimental design, statistical analyses, or
results that these actions ultimately turn out to be well-matched between officer and civilian
because each of the 27 actions has its own moral and physical severity estimates that are
relative to all of the other actions. As we explain later, results show that the estimates for
these five differing actions are remarkably similar.
Vignette. A minimal vignette was constructed to state each action pair without intro-
ducing superfluous contextual details:
While working a patrol shift, a police officer was dispatched to a reported
crime, and in the course of the investigation, he came into contact with a civil-
ian. During their subsequent interaction, the following actions took place *in
the order listed below* (other actions may have occurred before, between, or
after):
Two specific actions were then listed, in bold font. There was one action by the civilian and
one action by the officer. Figure 8 shows an example of the display seen by participants.
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Measures. For each vignette with its two actions, participants were asked to make
four ratings of the second action, one rating per screen. Each rating was made using a
slider with anchors marked as indicated in parentheses:
• Please rate how much force is involved in the officer’s/civilian’s action: (0 = No
Force, 100 = Maximum Force)
• Please rate how morally acceptable the officer’s/civilian’s action is: (0 = Completely
Unacceptable, 100 = Completely Acceptable)
• Please rate the extent to which the officer/civilian used an appropriate level of force
(0 = Insufficient, 50 = Appropriate, 100 = Excessive)
• Please rate the extent to which the officer/civilian should be punished for his action:
(0 = Not at all, 100 = Severely)
The rating of force was designed to assess evaluations of the severity of the raw physical
force of the actions. The other three rating questions were intended to assess moral eval-
uations. Thus, these dependent measures allowed for a comparison between the physical
Figure 2. Example screenshot from the experiment.
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and moral dimensions of force severity. Only the appropriateness slider had its center point
labeled, because we wanted to provide participants with an opportunity to rate officer and
civilian actions as insufficient as well as excessive. It is worth noting that we consciously
opted to probe physical severity with only one question in order to keep the total number
of questions brief enough that the experiment duration remained tolerable for participants.
Intuitively, physical severity is a less complex concept than moral severity, and we col-
lected enough data to make precise estimates of scale values. Figure 8 shows an example
of the display with the response slider. Although the structure of SOLOF-style policies is
generally ordinal, we purposely used a continuous measurement scale in order to maximize
precision and to allow participants to respond in an unconstrained way. Importantly, our
continuous response scale does allow for actions to cluster into categories (e.g., six cat-
egories) if they are perceived that way, but it is also flexible if the underlying perceived
severity does not map well into discrete categories.
Procedure and Design
After informed consent, participants read a set of instructions explaining that they
would be presented with a scenario that was representative of a real life interaction involv-
ing a police officer and a civilian, accompanied by a pair of actions that occurred during
the encounter: one action by the police officer, and one by the civilian. Participants were
also told that the order in which any given pair of actions had occurred was the order in
which they were presented, and that other actions may have occurred before, between, or
after the two listed actions. This latter information was included in order to allow for some
ambiguity in the scenario as well as to increase the coherence of actions pairs that might
otherwise be perceived as nonsensical. For example, if the civilian strikes the officer with
a motor vehicle and subsequently the officer places handcuffs on the civilian, there must
have been other things that occurred between the actions. Participants were informed that
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they would be asked to make ratings of force, as well as appropriateness, moral acceptabil-
ity, and punishment, for the second action that occurred during the encounter (i.e., always
the action that occurred subsequent to the first action). Participants were also advised that
there were no right or wrong answers and that we only wanted their intuitive, thoughtful
responses. Following the instructions, participants provided ratings of general attitudes to-
ward police (J. A. Johnson, Hogan, & Zonderman, 1981). Complete details are provided at
https://osf.io/h6jg3.
Participants then viewed a series of 22 vignettes, each with a pair of actions. Officer-
civilian action pairings were manipulated within subjects. Because the 22 actions could be
performed by both the officer and the civilian in either order, the total number of possi-
ble action pairs was 968. Rather than present participants with all 968 action pairs, which
would have caused fatigue and inattentiveness, we instead permuted the officer and civilian
actions separately and then paired them together to form uniquely randomized action pairs
for each participant. By using this method, we were able to present participants with only
22 action pairs while still ensuring that every participant saw the civilian and officer per-
forming all 22 actions without any action repetition within a given role. Once the 22 action
pairs had been selected, 11 random pairs were assigned to the civilian evaluation condition
(i.e., the officer action was listed first followed by the civilian action, and participants were
asked to rate the civilian action), and the remaining 11 pairs were assigned to the officer
evaluation condition (i.e., the civilian action was listed first followed by the officer action,
and participants were asked to rate the officer action). Finally, all 22 action pairs were
randomly ordered so that ratings of civilian and officer actions would be interspersed as the
experiment progressed. Participants were not informed about the set of possible actions or
the constraints on their pairings. For each vignette, the four measures (force, moral accept-
ability, appropriateness, punishment) were presented in a random order, one at a time.
Eleven attentiveness checks were also inserted randomly for some of the action pairs.
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A random number of these catch questions instructed participants to move the slider all the
way to the left, and the remainder all the way to the right. These catch trials were crucial
for identifying participants who were not providing thoughtful answers or not following
instructions, a concern that is especially important when using crowd-sourced participant
pools (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014).
Following the scenario ratings, participants answered a series of questions designed to
assess their beliefs about police legitimacy (Gerber & Jackson, 2017), as well as questions
measuring the number of personal and vicarious negative experiences with police (Weitzer,
2005). The focus of the current analysis is on developing precise psychometric estimates of
the actions, so these individual-difference measures will not be discussed at length here (but
see the Appendix for a detailed list of these measures). Further discussion of the individual
difference measures can be found in Celestin and Kruschke (2019b). The experiment con-
cluded with a series of demographic questions, including a single item measure of political
affiliation (Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012), and a debriefing. Complete details
are available in the Appendix and the supplementary material (https://osf.io/h6jg3).
Software
The experimental sequence was programmed using the JavaScript, html, and CSS pro-
gramming languages, with the open-source libraries available in the jsPsych package (de
Leeuw, 2015). The experiment was made available to participants online using an open-
source psiTurk (Gureckis et al., 2015) or Apache server running on a desktop computer
in combination with a SQL database or server-side PHP scripts. In addition, data clean-
ing, pre-processing, and analysis were done using the R programming language, RStudio
(Team, 2016), JAGS (Plummer, 2003), runjags (Denwood, 2016), and Stan (Stan Develop-
ment Team, 2016) software, as well as variants of the Bayesian analysis programs provided
by Kruschke (2015).
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Results
Data Analysis
In our analyses, the key dependent variables are the moral ratings of acceptability, pun-
ishment, excessiveness, and the rating of physical force. Upon visual inspection of the raw
data, we observed that the distributions of responses on the 1-100 sliding scale often piled
at the extreme high or low end of the scale. This is an indication that the scale itself was
limiting participant responses, and that extreme responses would often exceed the scale
limits if measured in an unconstrained manner. That is, piling of responses at the extremes
indicates that participants would have sometimes responded even greater than 100 or less
than 1 if they could have done so. Therefore, we treated responses less than 6 or greater
than 94 as censored, meaning that they indicated some uncertain value at least that extreme.
To make the distributions of uncensored values nearly normal, we applied a logit transfor-
mation to all responses (after dividing by 100). Complete details are in the R code available
at (https://osf.io/h6jg3).
We modeled the (censored and logit transformed) ratings using linear regression in
which each trial’s rating was described as an additive influence of the latent scale values of
civilian and officer actions. In other words, the ratings of the actions are a weighted com-
bination of the underlying scale values of the actions. As an intuitive example, consider
rating the acceptability of an officer action. As the severity of the officer action increases,
the action’s acceptability should (intuitively) decrease, implying that the regression coef-
ficient on officer-action severity would have negative sign. But as the preceding civilian
action increases in severity, the acceptability of the officer action should increase, imply-
ing that the regression coefficient on civilian-action severity would have positive sign. The
analysis estimates the regression coefficients and simultaneously estimates scale values for
the actions.
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Formally, the regression model states that the predicted rating, yˆ, is a weighted combi-
nation of the civilian action severity, γ, and the officer action severity, χ, as follows:
yˆq,c,f = β0,q︸︷︷︸
baseline
+ β1,q︸︷︷︸
influence of civilian action
·
civilian action severity︷︸︸︷
γc + β2,q︸︷︷︸
influence of officer action
·
officer action severity︷︸︸︷
χf (1)
where yˆ represents the predicted value of a rating (logit transformed), q indexes the rating
question (1–8, i.e., the four types of ratings of both officer and civilian actions), c indexes
the civilian action (1–22), f indexes the officer action (1–22), γ denotes the estimated
civilian-action scale value, and χ denotes the estimated officer-action scale value. Each
of the β variables is an estimated regression coefficient. The regression coefficients and
action scale values were estimated simultaneously. We analyzed the three social/moral
questions (i.e., moral acceptability, appropriateness, and punishment) separately from the
force question, and derived separate latent scale values for perceived moral and physical
severities of the actions. Neither the moral nor the force questions were aggregated; rather,
they were included in their respective analyses simultaneously. For example, the moral
severity scale estimates are informed by all six social/moral questions (three officer, three
civilian).
The estimation of scale values is analogous to structural equation modeling in which
observed ratings covary with an underlying latent factor. Because of algebraic indetermi-
nacies inherent in linear regression, the latent scale must be pinned down at two arbitrary
points. We chose to fix the "waved" and "handgunHead" actions (see Figure 7 for full
action descriptions) at 1.0 and 6.0, respectively, because they were likely to be the most
extreme. The model did not constrain the other action estimates which were allowed to
exceed the bounds of the two pinned action values if warranted.
We also analyzed a variety of other regression models that involved individual-difference
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variables (e.g., beliefs about police legitimacy, negative police experience, political affil-
iation, participant race, participant gender, etc.) and various interactions of predictors.
These alternative analyses can be found in supplementary material (https://osf.io/h6jg3).
The resulting estimated scale values of actions were remarkably consistent across all of
the various models. Because the focus of this article is the scale values of the actions,
we report results from the simplest model that derives robustly stable scale estimates in
Equation 1. A more elaborate model is reported in a companion manuscript (Celestin &
Kruschke, 2019b) along with extensive discussion of the regression coefficients and trends
in the ratings. Notably, although this companion manuscript and the results we report here
are based on the same data, the analyses are mathematically different, focus on unique as-
pects of the models, and have substantively distinct implications. The current results focus
on the latent severity scales implied by the data and how those scales relate to the SOLOF
categories used by law enforcement. Whereas, in Celestin and Kruschke (2019b), the focus
is on the ratings of appropriateness, punishability, etc., and the relation of those ratings to
the predictors. For our purposes here, it is of primary importance to note that, despite the
use of more elaborate models, the latent severity scales remain essentially the same, and so
the results we report currently are robust to the inclusion of additional relevant predictors.
Bayesian method. We used Bayesian estimation of the parameters (Kruschke, 2015;
Kruschke & Liddell, 2018a, 2018b). Bayesian methods are particularly useful in this ap-
plication because they yield a complete posterior probability distribution over all of the
parameter values in our models, including the regression coefficients and the scale values
of the actions. We summarize the posterior distribution on a parameter by its mode (i.e.,
most probable value) and its 95% highest density interval (HDI), which spans the 95% most
probable parameter values. A narrower HDI indicates a more precisely estimated value.
Bayesian analysis requires specification of a prior probability distribution on the pa-
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rameters. We used a very broad, vague prior relative to the scale of the data. Consequently,
the prior distribution had negligible influence on the results.
Posterior distributions were computed using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) meth-
ods, in the R programming language, along with JAGS (Plummer, 2003) and runjags
(Denwood, 2016) software, using variants of the Bayesian analysis programs provided by
Kruschke (2015). All MCMC chains converged well, and the effective sample size for all
parameter chains approaches 10, 000.
Comparing Latent Scale Estimates and SOLOF Categories
Table 2
Estimated scale values for actions
Action (officer/civilian) Officer Force Officer Moral Civilian Force Civilian Moral
1 asked 0.98 (0.80, 1.16) 0.99 (0.79, 1.17) 1.11 (0.91, 1.28) 1.01 (0.88, 1.16)
2 waved 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1) 1 (1, 1)
3 stoodNear 1.06 (0.89, 1.24) 1.19 (1.00, 1.38) 1.24 (1.07, 1.41) 1.52 (1.40, 1.65)
4 nameCall 1.77 (1.62, 1.92) 2.56 (2.38, 2.70) 1.97 (1.82, 2.12) 2.60 (2.48, 2.70)
5 getBack 1.85 (1.70, 2.00) 1.51 (1.34, 1.70) 2.14 (2.00, 2.29) 2.47 (2.36, 2.57)
6 hurtThreat 2.18 (2.02, 2.30) 2.25 (2.07, 2.39) 2.40 (2.25, 2.53) 3.08 (2.97, 3.18)
7 handsUp/dontListen 2.58 (2.45, 2.72) 2.38 (2.19, 2.52) 2.45 (2.32, 2.59) 2.99 (2.88, 3.08)
8 handcuff/pulledAway 2.81 (2.69, 2.95) 2.05 (1.88, 2.22) 2.36 (2.22, 2.50) 2.44 (2.34, 2.55)
9 pepperSpray 3.52 (3.39, 3.64) 3.19 (3.03, 3.33) 3.82 (3.70, 3.96) 4.19 (4.09, 4.29)
10 armbar 3.72 (3.58, 3.84) 2.96 (2.80, 3.11) 4.14 (4.02, 4.28) 4.28 (4.18, 4.38)
11 flashlight 3.79 (3.67, 3.92) 3.84 (3.70, 4.00) 4.12 (4.00, 4.26) 4.24 (4.14, 4.34)
12 batonLeg/pipeLeg 3.82 (3.69, 3.96) 3.52 (3.36, 3.66) 4.36 (4.22, 4.48) 4.49 (4.38, 4.58)
13 punchFace 3.91 (3.77, 4.03) 4.02 (3.88, 4.17) 4.14 (4.01, 4.26) 4.27 (4.17, 4.37)
14 tazer 3.94 (3.82, 4.07) 3.27 (3.11, 3.41) 4.29 (4.16, 4.43) 4.53 (4.42, 4.62)
15 headbutt 3.98 (3.85, 4.10) 4.00 (3.86, 4.16) 4.19 (4.06, 4.31) 4.28 (4.18, 4.38)
16 kickStom 3.99 (3.86, 4.12) 3.98 (3.84, 4.13) 4.05 (3.93, 4.18) 4.25 (4.13, 4.34)
17 choke 4.07 (3.94, 4.20) 3.80 (3.64, 3.94) 4.30 (4.18, 4.45) 4.46 (4.36, 4.56)
18 beanbag/ballBat 4.20 (4.08, 4.35) 4.01 (3.86, 4.16) 4.44 (4.31, 4.58) 4.63 (4.53, 4.74)
19 headSlam 4.52 (4.39, 4.66) 4.97 (4.81, 5.12) 4.80 (4.66, 4.94) 4.93 (4.82, 5.03)
20 vehicle 5.07 (4.93, 5.22) 5.83 (5.69, 6.03) 5.25 (5.11, 5.39) 5.28 (5.17, 5.39)
21 handgunChest 5.43 (5.27, 5.58) 5.50 (5.35, 5.66) 5.70 (5.55, 5.87) 5.60 (5.49, 5.73)
22 handgunHead 6 (6, 6) 6 (6, 6) 6 (6, 6) 6 (6, 6)
Numerical entries indicate the modal estimate and 95% HDI. Rows are ordered by ascend-
ing estimates of the "Officer Force" column. Please see Figure 7 for expanded descriptions
of the action names.
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Figure 3. Latent scale values from ratings of force. The upper panel plots the latent action
estimates for the civilian, and the horizontal axis denotes γ in Equation 1. The lower
panel plots the latent action estimates for the officer, and the horizontal axis denotes χ in
Equation 1.
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The latent scale values derived from the ratings of physical force are plotted in Figure 3
along the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis represents the SOLOF levels. Detailed nu-
merical values of the latent scale values are shown in Table 2. From Figure 3 it can be seen
that the latent severity of physical force tends to increase with the SOLOF levels, but there
are also clear discrepancies between the latent severity of physical force and the SOLOF
levels. Importantly, actions in SOLOF levels ’3’, ’4’, and ’5’ have latent force severities
that overlap substantially, indicating that participants are not strongly distinguishing these
actions from one another in terms of physical force. This lack of differentiation among the
SOLOF levels ’3’, ’4’, and ’5’ is evident for both civilian and officer actions.
The latent scale values derived from the ratings of moral attributes are plotted in Fig-
ure 4. Detailed numerical values of the latent scale values are shown in Table 2. From
Figure 4 it can be seen that the latent moral severity tends to increase with the SOLOF lev-
els, but there are also clear discrepancies between the latent moral severity and the SOLOF
levels. Importantly, for civilians, actions in SOLOF levels ’3’, ’4’, and ’5’ have latent
moral severities that overlap substantially, indicating that participants are not distinguish-
ing these actions from one another in terms of moral severity. For officers, SOLOF levels
’4’ and ’5’ overlap, with most actions of level ’5’ actually falling below the moral severity
of actions in level ’4’. It is notable that the perceived severities of SOLOF level ’4’ and
’5’ actions completely overlap. This suggests that once non-lethal actions reach a certain
severity threshold, they are not morally very distinguishable from one another for officers
or civilians.
Another prominent feature of the scale values is that one action that is in SOLOF level
’3’ has scale values among the SOLOF level ’2’ actions. The action in question is hand-
cuffing for officers and its matched action, pulling away, for civilians (see Figure 7 for
full action descriptions). The fact that handcuffing by a police officer and pulling away by
a civilian are scaled similarity provides some confirmation that those actions were indeed
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Figure 4. Latent scales for moral ratings (i.e., appropriateness, acceptability, and punish-
ment). The upper panel plots the latent action estimates for the civilian, and the horizontal
axis denotes γ in Equation 1. The lower panel plots the latent action estimates for the
officer, and the horizontal axis denotes χ in Equation 1.
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well-matched as comparably severe actions. Handcuffing and pulling away are physical ac-
tions, not verbal actions, and therefore would be situated in SOLOF level ’3’ (see Table 2).
Nevertheless, ratings of physical forcefulness and moral appropriateness place those ac-
tions less severely, in the range of the verbal actions of SOLOF level ’2’.
Comparing Physical and Moral Scale Estimates
The moral scale values are plotted against the force scale values in Figures 5 and 6.
Figure 5 shows the estimates for the officer’s actions, and Figure 6 for the civilian’s actions.
Recall that the least severe action was arbitrarily set at a scale value of 1.0 and the most
severe action was arbitrarily set at a scale value of 6.0, and that all other actions were
estimated relative to these two fixed points, so it is the relative not the absolute relationships
that are informative in these figures. In particular, the diagonal line is displayed merely as
a visual guide to proportionality and ordinality. The diagonal line should not be treated as
a line of equality across scales because the scale values could be shifted or stretched on
either axis. The segments intersecting the plotted points in Figure 5 and Figure 6 represent
95% HDIs. As indicated by the relatively short length of the HDI segments, all of the scale
values were estimated with considerable precision on both force and moral dimensions.
One notable pattern in Figures 5 and 6 is non-monotonicities in moral severity as force
severity increases. If moral severity were proportional to force severity, then an increase
in force severity would always produce an increase in moral severity. But this does not
always occur. For example, in Figure 5 the moral severity of handCuff is less than the moral
severity of nameCall, even though the force severity of handCuff is greater than the force
severity of nameCall (see Figure 7 for full action descriptions). These non-monotonicities
reveal actions that are either perceived as more morally than physically severe or vice-versa.
The lack of differentiation for non-lethal categories observed in Figures 3 and 4 is
also prominent in the relatively tight clustering of all three physical but non-lethal actions
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Figure 5. Posterior estimates of latent action scale values for the officer. The scale values
for the moral questions are plotted on the vertical axis as a function of the estimated scale
values for the force questions on the horizontal axis. Segments through each point represent
the 95% HDI’s. Each point is labeled by the abbreviated action name in Table 7.
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Figure 6. Posterior estimates of latent action scale values for the civilian. The scale values
for the moral questions are plotted on the vertical axis as a function of the estimated scale
values for the force questions on the horizontal axis. Segments through each point represent
the 95% HDI’s. Each point is labeled by the abbreviated action name in Figure 7.
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in Figures 5 and 6. In contrast, the lethal and verbal actions (SOLOF levels 6 and 2,
respectively) are relatively spread out – especially the lethal actions. That is, the severity
of verbal and lethal actions exhibits considerable variability relative to non-lethal actions.
Because of the potential concern associated with implausible disparate action pairs to
skew the results, we applied the model to a subset of data that excluded any pairs of SOLOF
level 1 with SOLOF level 6, which comprised about 4.9% of all trials. We observed that
responses to these extreme pairings were consistent and reasonable. Additionally, we re-
ran our analyses on a subset of data that excluded these extreme pairs and observed that the
latent severity estimates were virtually unchanged. As mentioned in the Method, we also
ran a variety of analyses including all of the individual difference measures we collected,
and the latent severity estimates are virtually identical to those reported currently. That
is, the latent severity estimates we report are robust, and the patterns we describe in this
article do not change when extreme action pairings are excluded or when additional relevant
individual difference predictors are included in our models.
Discussion
Our results provide a detailed initial map of the latent moral and physical severity of
a set of realistic actions that represent the complete range of force options. Because these
actions are broadly representative and include many of the most common forceful actions
actually employed by and against police, they yield a comprehensive view of action sever-
ity perceptions, and offer insight into discrepancies between lay and formal evaluations of
force. Moreover, 17 of our 22 actions were identical for the officer and civilian, and the re-
maining 5 were matched a priori based on our intuitions which were confirmed empirically
by the remarkably similar severity estimates when comparing the matched actions in Fig-
ures 3 and 4 and Figures 5 and 6. Finally, the combination of a large number of participants
and Bayesian methods provided precisely estimated scale values.
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This new set of scale values reveals that lay perceptions of police and civilian use of
force are substantially disconnected from the way force is traditionally categorized in most
law enforcement agencies (i.e., using a SOLOF-style classification). Psychologically, non-
lethal physical (beyond verbal) actions cluster together and effectively merge half of the
canonical SOLOF categories (i.e., all three levels of non-lethal physical actions). But
within the categories of verbal and lethal force, lay participants distinguish much more
variable action severities.
Implications
Of the discrepancies revealed in Figures 3 to 6, handcuffing stands out as a unique ex-
ample. While it is clearly on the physical side of the verbal-physical boundary, it is also a
routine police procedure in nearly all arrests, regardless of whether a civilian resists, and
therefore might be perceived as especially normal and acceptable relative to other physi-
cal actions. Likewise, pulling away (the matched civilian action for handcuffing) may be
viewed as maintaining personal autonomy and as more defensive than offensive relative
to other physical actions. Moreover, while some handcuffing and pulling away may be
highly forceful, it is possible to handcuff or pull away in a relatively gentle manner, which
is something that does not seem to be true for any of the other physical actions.
The general pattern of non-monotonicities can largely be explained, we believe, in
terms of the intuitive normatitivies of the actions for the roles. For the role of police of-
ficer, intuitively normative actions involve official tools such as handcuffs, pepper spray,
and tazers, while intuitively non-normative actions (i.e., actions that are not primarily or
uniquely associated with police officers) include name calling and hitting someone with a
motor vehicle. In Figure 5 it can be seen that the moral severity of normative actions tends
to fall well below the diagonal reference line, while the moral severity of non-normative
actions tends to fall above the diagonal reference line.
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Thus, for police officers, actions that are not normative (e.g., striking with a motor vehi-
cle) may be evaluated as less acceptable than other actions that are more strongly associated
with police (e.g., handgun shot to chest), even if both of those actions are categorized as
lethal force according to the SOLOF system. This distinction by lay people is particularly
notable because it diverges from the way that courts evaluate actions and the way that police
officers train to identify when lethal force is appropriate under realistic time and resource
constraints.
There are relatively few non-monotonicities for the civilian actions in Figure 6, but
the few that occur may also be explained by normativity. In some sense, any action by a
civilian more severe than cooperation is not prescriptively normative, but we are concerned
here with moral severity (of civilian actions) that is not proportional to physical severity (of
those civilian actions) in response to forceful actions by police officers. Specifically, for
civilians it is not normative to call a police officer names or to threaten a police officer, and
these actions have moral severities that fall well above the diagonal reference line.
Normativity in Lethal Force
In general, police rely on legal precedent that treats police use of force as a seizure
under the 4th amendment, and only affirms lethal force as lawful if a "citizen poses a threat
of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others" (Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.
1, 1985); thus, lawful lethal force must be "objectively reasonable" (Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 3, 1989). Many law enforcement agencies use this criterion to establish a general
threshold, and when that threshold is exceeded, any form of lethal force is permitted in
order to accomplish the goal of stopping the threat, regardless of how role-normative it is.
Thus, lethal force actions are formally evaluated in a binary manner as either justified or
not. In contrast, the psychological separation of different lethal force actions observed in
Figure 5 suggests that lay perceptions of moral severity are not categorical, and that lay
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evaluators have a more nuanced view of lethal actions than formal evaluative criteria.
This disconnect between professional and lay evaluations of non-normative lethal force
application was especially evident in the case of a sniper attack in Dallas, Texas on July
7, 2016. During this attack, Micah Xavier Johnson killed five police officers, injured nine
other officers and two civilians, and then barricaded himself inside of an El Centro Col-
lege building where he engaged surrounding police with gunfire (Wikipedia Contributors,
2017). After negotiations failed, Dallas police maneuvered a robot carrying an explosive
device near Johnson and killed him. This event was the first time a law enforcement agency
in the U.S. had used a robot to deploy lethal force, making it highly non-normative. Consis-
tent with the pattern observed in our results, considerable moral outrage was subsequently
voiced by the public, not only about the use of lethal force but about the specific and un-
usual way it was employed (Fountain & Schmidt, 2016; King, 2016).
Our theory, that normative actions are perceived as less morally severe than their phys-
ical severity would imply, is post hoc and we will investigate it further in the future. Mean-
while, we note that it is consistent with other recent research that suggests people think of
frequently observed actions as morally acceptable actions. Lindström, Jangard, Selbing,
and Olsson (2018) showed that people more strongly endorse free riding on a public good
when free riding is common. Those authors suggested that people use a general judgment
heuristic: common is moral. In work using multiple cognitive tasks, Eriksson, Strimling,
and Coultas (2014, p. 60) showed that people have strong associations between what is
common and what is moral, and cited earlier work showing that “moral judgments of so-
cially undesirable behavior tend to be less harsh when the behavior is perceived to be com-
mon (McGraw, 1985; Trafimow, Reeder, & Blising, 2001; Welch et al., 2005)”. Thus, we
believe it is very plausible that actions perceived to be normative and common for police
officers should also be judged to be less morally severe than those actions’ physical force
would suggest. Importantly, our conceptualization of normativity only includes actions that
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are common and also not routinely punished as we discuss below in the limitations.
Dealing with the Disconnect
The patterns in our data point to questions that may promote understanding among all
parties invested in police-civilian interactions. For example, the difference in moral severity
between an officer yelling "get back" at the civilian and pepper spraying the civilian is
quite large according to lay evaluation, but the difference is only one level of force in
SOLOF-style scales. Does this imply that official policies should make finer distinctions
at the boundary between verbal and physical actions? As another example, it appears that
the perceived normativity of a police action influences the way that lay people judge the
action’s moral severity. Should this be treated as a cognitive bias in lay evaluation that
should be corrected because what counts as normative may be an accident of history? Or
should this influence of normativity be incorporated into the official classification of actions
to emphasize normative actions and de-emphasize nonnormative actions? Finally, it is
clear that lay people do not strongly distinguish among SOLOF levels ’3,’ ’4,’ and ’5’
(i.e., the non-lethal beyond-verbal actions). Does this failure to distinguish levels reflect
a lack of expertise, implying that law enforcement agencies need to educate the public
about important gradations in physical force? Or does the lay perception imply that official
classifications should collapse or reorganize some levels?
Importantly, the disconnect does not necessarily imply that SOLOF-style scales should
be abandoned. Many activists who are currently calling for reformative changes to how
the police use force are explicitly recommending the ubiquitous adoption of SOLOF-style
rules by all law enforcement agencies in the US (Campaign Zero, 2018). The widespread
adoption of SOLOF-style categorizations presumably means they are useful, and careful
consideration of the challenges surrounding use-of-force decision-making reveals the need
for some sort of specific structure to guide officers in the field. But our results may suggest
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ways to bring law-enforcement and lay perceptions into closer alignment. For example, ed-
ucational outreach programs might help lay people understand how police and the legal sys-
tem classify use of force, especially targeting the discrepancies from lay intuition revealed
by the present research. As another example, knowing that more role-normative actions are
viewed by the public as less morally severe than non-normative actions may guide officers
when choosing a force option within a particular SOLOF level. Additionally, the public
might be educated to be wary of becoming morally de-sensitized (or hyper-sensitized) to
the forcefulness of actions merely because of their normalization (or lack thereof).
Limitations and Future Directions
As with any empirical research, there are limitations that apply to our findings. One is
that, although we selected our 22 actions in order to maximize representativeness and intra-
SOLOF-category diversity across the whole spectrum of police and civilian force options,
those we selected are merely a sample of all possible actions. Nevertheless, because of our
selection procedure, we fully expect that alternative sets of actions will replicate the general
patterns we observe even as there are likely to be idiosyncratic differences for some actions.
Our vignettes only used two actions, but real-life conflict between police and civilians
is comprised of a set of many interdependent actions that occur over the time-course of an
encounter. Future research could explore how moral evaluations are affected by a sequence
of interdependent actions between officers and civilians, perhaps paying special attention to
how increasing or decreasing the severity of force over time alters perceptions about officer
or civilian intentions to escalate or de-escalate conflict. In addition, our use of vignettes
allows for enhanced control over stimuli, but may be more limited than video in terms of
realism.
In this article we have focused on the scale estimates of actions without describing
the pattern of moral and physical ratings for specific pairs of actions. In particular, the
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scale values alone do not reveal whether lay expectations generally align with common law
enforcement heuristics such as the "one level above" heuristic. These ratings are described
in a companion paper by Celestin and Kruschke (2019b). Moreover, future studies can use
the scale estimates we provide to precisely compare the severity of actions chosen by lay
evaluators as appropriate police responses to specific civilian violence.
Currently, it is unclear to what extent the disconnect we observe between formal use-
of-force policies and lay intuitions emerges as a result of differential expertise rather than
moral disagreement. To investigate this issue, future research should attempt to disentan-
gle the influence of descriptive and prescriptive effects on lay evaluations of force. One
approach would be to teach lay evaluators about SOLOF-style force categorization and
common law enforcement heuristic rules and then observe whether and how that affects
subsequent judgments. Care would need to be taken to avoid experimenter demand effects,
but such an approach could provide useful information for law enforcement agencies re-
garding how to allocate resources to target educational public outreach efforts or to hone
their use-of-force policies to maximize alignment with public morality.
Finally, future research should clarify what conditions are needed for common (i.e.,
normative) actions to be perceived as moral (or less immoral) actions. We suspect that
actions become perceived as less immoral especially when those actions are not routinely
punished or disparaged. Actions that are perceived to be frequent but are also routinely
punished may still be perceived to be immoral.
Conclusion
Because police use of force is a highly moralized topic, evaluating specific instances of
applied force is likely to always involve some contention between police and civilian ob-
servers. In fact, reasonable people — both lay citizens and officers — can and do disagree
about whether specific instances of force are necessary or excessive, and even whether in-
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stances that are identified as excessive are isolated incidents or whether they imply a broad
problem and the need for systemic change (Morin, Parker, Stepler, & Mercer, 2017). Re-
gardless of how one makes such inferences, it has become clear that police actions are
promptly evaluated in the court of public opinion, and it matters little to lay evaluators
whether a particular set of actions falls within the law or within agency protocol if the
intuitive public reaction to viewing the episode evokes sufficient moral outrage. It is our
hope that the results presented here will provide an empirically-grounded starting point for
helping to bring together lay and professional moral evaluations of use of force.
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Chapter 3: Lay evaluations of police and civilian use of force: Moral and physical
magnitude ratings of officer and civilian actions
In the United States, police use of force is constrained by the fourth amendment of the
Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court declared that judging whether or not police use of
force is reasonable is so idiosyncratic that it "is not capable of precise definition or me-
chanical application" (Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 1979). Nevertheless, law enforcement
agencies must provide guidance to officers in the field, and during the past century agencies
have developed more detailed use-of-force policies for that purpose. Most policies include
categorical levels of force, commonly referred to as force “continua” even though they are
not actually continuous scales, that bin specific actions into categories according to their
severity. The levels of the categories are generally described without specific situational
details; for example a level might be labeled as deadly force and refer to any action in
nearly any situation that may result in great bodily harm or death. Binning actions into
these categorical levels of force is intended to provide a framework for decision-making,
with which officers can act at a level of force that is “objectively reasonable” (Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 1985).
If lay evaluations of force are not well aligned with law-enforcement policies, there
may be serious disputes between public and official judgments of appropriateness. But re-
search focused on how lay observers evaluate instances of police violence is scant (Jefferis,
Butcher, & Hanley, 2011; Gerber & Jackson, 2017). In particular, we are not aware of
any previous research that has investigated the detailed correspondence of lay evaluations
of force with the categorical structure used by law enforcement across the entire severity
range of force options. Moreover, very little research has experimentally studied the ef-
fects of beliefs about police legitimacy on evaluations of civilian resistance toward police;
instead, the focus has tended to be on police actions or on motivating civilian coopera-
tion (Thompson & Daniel Lee, 2004; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Gerber & Jackson, 2017).
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A general relationship between high-legitimacy and reduced support for vigilante violence
has been demonstrated (Jackson, Huq, Bradford, & Tyler, 2013), but we are unaware of any
research on legitimacy modulating evaluations of a wide array of specific civilian reactions
to police — especially not in a manner that corresponds to the way actions are described
in police training and policy. The present research provides a map of lay evaluations of ac-
tions that comprehensively span the force categories, and offers insight into how legitimacy
affects judgments of both police and civilian violence.
Police and civilian perspectives on use of force
There are raging debates about whether force used by police is morally appropriate.
Take, for example, the case of Terence Crutcher who was shot by Tulsa, Oklahoma po-
lice officer Betty Jo Shelby who believed Crutcher was reaching for a weapon when, in
fact, he was unarmed (Salinger, 2016). Or the case of Daniel Shaver — an intoxicated
but unarmed man who was shot by Mesa, Arizona police officer Phillip Brailsford while
crying and begging officers "please do not shoot" (Friedersdorf, 2017a, 2017c). In both of
these cases the officers (i.e., Shelby and Brailsford) were criminally prosecuted, but juries
ultimately acquitted them of all charges. Nevertheless, these cases (and others like them)
are extraordinarily tragic, and seem to many people — including the families of Crutcher
and Shaver and protesters who rallied around them — to represent unnecessary and im-
moral levels of violence inflicted by police (Hogan, 2017; Friedersdorf, 2017a). On the
other hand, consider the case of a female Chicago police officer whose face was repeatedly
slammed into the pavement by a male suspect until she lost consciousness and "thought
she was gonna die," but even in that moment resolved not to use her firearm "because she
didn’t want her family or department to go through the scrutiny the next day on the na-
tional news" (Gorner & Dardick, 2016). Or the recent mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman
Douglass high school, during which multiple Broward County sheriff’s deputies — includ-
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ing school resource deputy Scot Peterson — remained stationary outside the building for
four to six minutes while Nikolas Cruz was actively murdering the students and teachers
inside (Stewart, 2018). It is unknowable how many of the 17 people killed (or 17 others
wounded) might have been saved from harm if the first responders on the scene had en-
gaged Cruz immediately, but given that the entire shooting only lasted about six minutes
(Blinder & Mazzei, 2018; Wikipedia Contributors, 2018), the number of victims would
almost certainly have been dramatically reduced.
In all of the aforementioned cases, the facts lend themselves to a relatively extreme and
singular moral interpretation (i.e., either excessive or insufficient/negligent levels of force
used by police). But, notably, even in these cases, there is considerable disagreement about
whether the police acted appropriately; different members of the public (and even different
law enforcement officers and agencies) have very different attitudes about what constitutes
appropriate police use of force. In more ambiguous cases, where some of the facts are more
reasonable and uncertainty is amplified, this problem is exacerbated.
We point out these controversies regarding police use of force to emphasize a key
premise: Public perceptions of police use of force often seem to be misaligned with law-
enforcement implementations (and, ultimately, judicial/legal outcomes) of use of force. (If
they did match, there wouldn’t be such vociferous disputes.) On the one hand, law enforce-
ment policies usually categorize forceful actions into discrete levels and agencies provide
heuristics regarding which level of force is appropriate relative to the level of civilian re-
sistance confronting officers. On the other hand, lay perceptions of the appropriateness
of actions might be quite different than the organization and heuristics of official policies.
Moreover, lay perceptions are likely to be modulated by relevant individual differences.
Given the apparent conflict between public outrage and legal assessment police use of force,
research investigating how they align and diverge is crucial for maximizing police efficacy
and public trust. In the next two sections, we describe law enforcement policies and some
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Level Description
1 Cooperation, physical proximity, polite dialogue.
2 Strong verbal interaction.
3 Open hand control, defensive resistance, non-deadly weapon use
with minimal injury potential.
4 Closed hand techniques.
5 Intermediate or aggravated force, non-deadly weapon used with
moderate injury potential.
6 Deadly force.
Table 3
Six ordinal levels of force (SOLOF) scale.
important individual differences among people.
Six ordinal levels of force (SOLOF)
At least 80% of law enforcement agencies use a list of rank-ordered force options as
part of their official use-of-force policy (Terrill et al., 2011). These formal classifications
provide guidance for how the officers employed at a given government agency are allowed
to use force. Rank-ordered classifications of force are also prescribed within the social
scientific literatures, where police and civilian actions are separated into distinct lists of
role-specific categories (Terrill et al., 2003; Alpert & Dunham, 2004). These lists are
used to calculate the proportionality of police use of force relative to civilian resistance by
quantifying a difference score, dubbed a "force factor". There is some evidence that this
method for evaluating the reasonableness or excessiveness of force is reliable (Hickman et
al., 2015) and useful for professionals.
Nearly three quarters of all law enforcement agencies use a 5 or 6 level classification
(Terrill et al., 2011), and Terrill et al. (2003) recommend a six-category list for evaluation of
police use of force and civilian resistance. Therefore, the current study used a six-category
list shown in Table 3 and described more completely in the Method section. Because this
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type of force categorization is not actually continuous, we refer to this list as the six ordinal
levels of force (SOLOF) scale (rather than using the common "force continuum" language).
Notably, the descriptions of the levels in Table 3 do not specify contextual details such as
location, time of day, or state of mind (e.g., intoxication). Instead, the levels are decontex-
tualized because specifying all possible relevant contextual variables would be unwieldy
and intractable, and also maximize correspondence with law enforcement policies.
Individual differences: legitimacy beliefs
A considerable amount of research has investigated the factors that influence public
evaluations of police. Although salient demographic factors such as race (D. Johnson &
Kuhns, 2009) and gender (Chapman, 2012) do affect attitudes about police, the strongest
and most salient individual difference that predicts differential evaluations of police con-
duct are people’s existing beliefs about police legitimacy (Tyler, 2006). That is, legitimacy
beliefs are the key individual difference to observe when measuring attitudes about the
justness of police actions, including the use of force.
Beliefs about police legitimacy are driven by current and prior perceptions of police
acting in a procedurally just manner (e.g., behaving respectfully toward citizens and al-
lowing them to voice their perspective) (Mazerolle, Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013),
and these perceptions are grounded in the social context to which evaluators are or have
been exposed (Braga, Winship, Tyler, Fagan, & Meares, 2014). Legitimacy beliefs in-
clude at least two subcomponents (Gerber & Jackson, 2017): (1) felt obligation, which is
the degree to which a person feels obligated to obey the police; and (2) norm alignment,
which is the extent to which a person believes that their own values align with the values
of the police. These two dimensions are drawn from the theoretical conceptualization of
the legitimacy of authority rooted in a process-based model of procedural justice (Tyler,
2006; Hamm, Trinkner, & Carr, 2017). This model prioritizes perceptions of fairness over
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outcome-driven evaluations as the primary predictor of legitimacy beliefs, and posits that
the extent to which citizens’ values align with those in authority (i.e., norm alignment) and
the extent to which they grant authority figures the ability to dictate acceptable behavior
(i.e., felt obligation) together comprise individual perceptions of fairness and, thus, of the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of authority figures, including police.
Assaying lay perceptions of specific forceful actions
In the present research, we generated a list of specific actions for each of the SOLOF
levels. These actions could be performed by either a police officer or a civilian with whom
the officer was interacting. Lay participants rated the morality and physical severity of
police or civilian actions when performed in response to an action by the other party. Trends
in ratings were captured by Bayesian regression models that predicted ratings as a function
of the actions and the rater’s legitimacy beliefs, gender, race, and political affiliation.
Method
Participants
To maximize the diversity and generalizability of our sample, we collected data from
the Indiana University (IU) undergraduate subject pool in the Department of Psychological
and Brain Sciences and from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Analyses were initially
run separately for the IU and MTurk samples, and then combined after we observed that
the model descriptions for each sample were virtually identical. Supplementary material
presents the separate analyses (https://osf.io/h6jg3).
We recruited 411 MTurk participants and 395 IU subject pool participants, all of whom
completed the study through a web browser. Participation requirements constrained par-
ticipation to individuals residing in the United States who were 18 or older at the time of
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participation and who were fluent in English. Although we set up MTurk requirements to
disallow non-US participation, we also recorded geolocation information associated with
the Internet Protocol addresses used by participants, and subsequently excluded 38 MTurk
participants for participating from outside the US. We excluded participants who missed
more than one of the 11 attention checks. We also excluded participants who had a mean
absolute deviation (MAD) in their ratings that was more than three standard deviations be-
low the mean MAD of all participants because very small MAD probably indicates leaving
the response slider at its default level for most trials. This data cleaning procedure resulted
in a final N of 350 MTurk participants and 317 IU subject pool participants. The combined
total N was 667.
A demographic breakdown of our 667 participants, according to the categories they
selected on the questionnaire at the conclusion of the experiment, included 404 females,
261 males, and 2 participants who selected other. There were 3 American Indian/Alaska
Native participants, 71 Asian participants, 54 Black or African American participants, 32
Hispanic or Latino participants, 486 White participants, 19 participants who selected More
than one, and 2 participants who selected Unknown.
Design
Using a combined version of Terrill et al. (2003)’s separated civilian resistance and
officer force levels, we constructed a list of forceful actions that could reasonably be per-
formed by either an officer or a civilian. We then selected 22 representative actions from
this list, ensuring that at least three actions were located, a priori, in each of the six SOLOF
categories. In addition to this primary goal of choosing broadly representative actions, we
also tried to choose actions that were diverse and realistic. These actions were presented
de-contextualized (i) to match the de-contextualized nature of the SOLOF levels and (ii)
because specifying contextual details would introduce myriad additional factors. Seventeen
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SOLOF 
Level
Action Statement
1
the [officer/civilian] stood near the [civilian/officer]
the [officer/civilian] asked the [civilian/officer] how he was doing
the [officer/civilian] waved at the [civilian/officer] in greeting
2
the [officer/civilian] yelled “get back” at the [civilian/officer]
the [officer/civilian] shouted “get your fucking hands up!” / “I don't have to fucking listen to 
you!” at the [civilian/officer]
the [officer/civilian] said “if you touch me, you're gonna get hurt” to the [civilian/officer]
the [officer/civilian] called the [civilian/officer] a “thug” / “pig”
3
the [officer/civilian] put handcuffs on/pulled away from the [civilian/officer]
the [officer/civilian] sprayed the [civilian/officer] with pepper spray
the [officer/civilian] shocked the [civilian/officer] with a tazer
the [officer/civilian] twisted the arm of the [civilian/officer], forcing him to the ground
4
the [officer/civilian] punched the [civilian/officer] in the face
the [officer/civilian] kicked the [civilian/officer] in the stomach
the [officer/civilian] applied a chokehold to the [civilian/officer]
the [officer/civilian] headbutted the [civilian/officer] in the face
5
the [officer/civilian] struck the [civilian/officer] on the leg with a collapsible baton/metal pipe
the [officer/civilian] shot/struck the [civilian/officer] in the chest with a beanbag shotgun 
round/baseball bat
the [officer/civilian] struck the [civilian/officer] in the stomach with a metal flashlight
6
the [officer/civilian] shot the [civilian/officer] in the chest with a handgun
the [officer/civilian] shot the [civilian/officer] in the head with a handgun
the [officer/civilian] struck the [civilian/officer] with a motor vehicle
the [officer/civilian] slammed the [civilian/officer]'s head into the concrete curb
Figure 7. Actions with their a priori SOLOF severity level from Table 3. Colors in SOLOF
column correspond to colors used in subsequent plots.
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of the actions were exactly the same for the officer and civilian, while 5 of the actions were
unique for those roles to ensure that they seemed plausible for a civilian or officer but were
rationally matched in terms of severity. For example, the officer action of handcuffing was
not performed by the civilian because it seems implausible that a civilian would handcuff
an officer. Instead, the action of pulling away was matched with handcuffing and assigned
exclusively to the civilian. Figure 7 displays all of the actions and the SOLOF category in
which we located them.
The current study employed a partially-crossed within-subjects design that randomly
permuted the separate lists of officer and civilian actions and then paired them together.
Eleven pairs were assigned to the "civilian" condition, in which the civilian action occurred
second and was the focus of the ratings, while the remaining 11 actions were assigned to
the "officer" condition in which the officer action occurred second and was the focus of the
ratings. The officer and civilian trials were randomly interspersed. This method assured
that in only 22 pairs of actions every participant saw all of the officer and civilian actions
(providing ratings of 11 civilian actions and 11 officer actions).
Procedure
Participants gave informed consent to take part in the study and were shown the follow-
ing instructions:
"On the following screens, you will be presented with scenarios that represent
real life interactions involving police officers and civilians. Officer and civil-
ian names have been purposefully excluded. For each scenario, you will be
presented with a pair of actions that occurred during the encounter. Each ac-
tion pair will include one action by the officer and one action by the civilian,
though other actions may have occurred before, between, or after the two ac-
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tions that are listed. The order in which the presented actions occurred during
the encounter is the order in which they are listed. It is very important that you
read each action description carefully, because the actions will change for each
scenario."
"You will be asked to make several ratings of some of the actions. You will
always be asked to rate the second action listed, but the specific actions and the
order of the questions will change between scenarios, so it is very important
that you read each question carefully prior to responding."
Participants were also instructed about the four rating questions (see details below) and
pairs of officer and civilian actions. We emphasized that the order in which the actions
occurred was the order in which they were presented to mitigate a potential confound of
action order that might arise if action order was ambiguous. Order alone clearly matters
for moral inference (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012). And it seems reasonable for partici-
pants to infer that whoever acts first in our scenario is initiating aggression and likely more
blameworthy as a moral agent, while whoever acts subsequently is responding as a moral
patient (Schein & Gray, 2017). The nature of the officer role potentially complicates this
dynamic, because a participant (especially one with high levels of trust in police) might
assume that police officers are always (or nearly always) responding to some prior violent
act or threat, even if it isn’t explicitly mentioned. Citizens, on the other hand, do not have
any such intrinsic benefit of the doubt, because the category of "citizen" is very general
and does not describe a set of professional responsibilities that include the legitimate use
of violence. For this reason, we always inquired about the second action which was explic-
itly preceded by an action from the other role. Thus, ratings were always of "reactions" to
the other party, to be sure there was no confounding of actor role (civilian vs officer) with
action order (action vs reaction).
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Figure 8. Example screenshot from the experiment.
Within each action rating trial, participants read a short vignette as shown in the screen
shot of Figure 8. As can be seen in both, actions were displayed as bulleted points which
were emphasized using bold font. The key word in every rating question was also displayed
in bold font. The rating questions were presented one at a time in random order, and
participants made each rating by adjusting the location of a slider on a bar spanning the
range of 0 to 100. The rating questions and their semantic anchors are listed below:
• Please rate how much force is involved in the officer’s/civilian’s action: (0 = No
Force, 100 = Maximum Force)
• Please rate how morally acceptable the officer’s/civilian’s action is: (0 = Completely
Unacceptable, 100 = Completely Acceptable)
• Please rate the extent to which the officer/civilian used an appropriate level of force
(0 = Insufficient, 50 = Appropriate, 100 = Excessive)
• Please rate the extent to which the officer/civilian should be punished for his action:
(0 = Not at all, 100 = Severely)
52
In order to ensure thoughtful responding and to provide a mechanism by which to ex-
clude participants who were not engaged in the task, 11 attention checks were inserted in
random places in the sequence for some action pairs. Each attentiveness question explicitly
advised participants to move the slider to the leftmost or rightmost position on the scale.
Following the action rating trials, participants answered six, randomly ordered ques-
tions measuring the two subcomponents of police legitimacy beliefs (Gerber & Jackson,
2017) which are (1) felt obligation: the extent to which someone believes they should obey
police, and (2) norm alignment: the extent to which someone believes that their own values
overlap those of the police. The specific questions capturing these two dimensions were as
follows:
• Felt Obligation
– You should support the decisions made by police officers even when you dis-
agree with them.
– You should do what the police tell you even if you do not understand or agree
with the reasons.
– You should do what the police tell you to do even if you do not like how they
treat you.
• Norm Alignment
– The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong that you do.
– The police stand up for values that are important to you.
– You and the police want the same things for your community.
Each of these legitimacy questions was answered by adjusting a slider ranging from 0
("completely disagree") to 100 (completely agree).
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Participants also answered yes/no questions measuring personal or vicarious negative
experiences with police (Weitzer, 2005):
• Personal
– Have you ever been stopped by police on the street without good reason?
– Have the police ever used insulting language toward you?
– Have you ever seen a police officer engage in any corrupt activities (e.g., taking
bribes or involvement in drug trade)?
– Have police ever used excessive force against you?
• Vicarious
– Have the police ever used insulting language toward anyone else in your house-
hold?
– Have police ever used excessive force against anyone else in your household?
– Has anyone else in your household ever been stopped on the street by police
without good reason?
In subsequent data analyses we considered regression models that used the negative-experience
answers as covariates, but ultimately found that they were not particularly useful. See dis-
cussion of the models below for further information and see also the supplementary mate-
rials (https://osf.io/h6jg3) for specific results that include these variables.
The experiment concluded with a series of demographic questions including race and
gender, as well as a single item measure of political affiliation (Iyer et al., 2012), and a
debriefing.
The experiment interface was programmed using JavaScript, html, and CSS, as well
as the libraries available in the jsPsych package (de Leeuw, 2015). We employed either a
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psiTurk (Gureckis et al., 2015) or apache server alongside a SQL database and PHP scripts
to run the experiment and save the data. Additionally, all data cleaning, pre-processing, and
analyses were conducted via the R programming language, RStudio (Team, 2016), JAGS
(Plummer, 2003), and Stan (Stan Development Team, 2016), and the programs available in
Kruschke (2015).
Results
Data transformation and regression model
The dependent variables are ratings of acceptability, excessiveness, punishment, and
force. Recall that these ratings were all made using a slider that ranged from 0 to 100.
Examining the raw distributions of each of these ratings revealed that a notable proportion
of the ratings fell at both ends of the scale, and the other ratings tended to form a unimodal
distribution that was skewed toward the middle. Therefore, we treated any response more
extreme than 5 or 95 as censored, meaning its value is not modeled as the specific slider
value but is instead modeled as an unknown value at least as extreme as 5 or 95, respec-
tively. To approximately normalize the uncensored data, we logit transformed all of the
ratings (after dividing by 100).
A key independent variable was participants’ beliefs in police legitimacy as measured
by their ratings of felt obligation (FO) and norm alignment (NA). FO and NA ratings were
highly reliable and strongly correlated. Specifically, the three items for FO had a Cron-
bach’s α = 0.82, the three items comprising NA had α = 0.87, and all six items together
had α = 0.87. The correlation between the combined FO and combined NA items was
ρ = 0.61. Because all of the items were so strongly related, the three questions measuring
felt obligation were averaged together, as were the three questions measuring norm align-
ment. These averaged ratings were then standardized. Finally, the two standardized ratings
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were averaged together to form one composite individual difference measure of police le-
gitimacy beliefs, denoted `. Notice that this legitimacy score is inherently standardized,
which implies that the mean ` is zero and that most values of ` fall between −2.0 and +2.0.
We constructed Bayesian linear regression models for each of the rating questions. Rat-
ings were described as a weighted combination of civilian action severity, officer action
severity, and legitimacy beliefs (i.e., `), along with selected interactions. The severity of
the officer and civilian actions were simultaneously estimated, yielding latent moral and
physical severity scales for the entire set of actions. These scale estimates are described in
detail in a separate report (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a), and the focus of this report is the
regression coefficients and corresponding trends in the ratings.
The regression model is expressed formally as
yˆq,c,f = (β0,q + β3,q ·`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
baseline
+ (β1,q + β4,q ·`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
influence of civilian action
·
civilian action severity︷︸︸︷
γc + (β2,q + β5,q ·`)︸ ︷︷ ︸
influence of officer action
·
officer action severity︷︸︸︷
χf + β6,q ·γc ·χf︸ ︷︷ ︸
civilian/officer severity interaction
(2)
= β0,q + β1,q ·γc + β2,q ·χf + β3,q ·`+ β4,q ·` · γc + β5,q ·` · χf + β6,q ·γc ·χf (3)
where yˆ represents the predicted value of a rating (logit transformed), q indexes the rating
question (1–8, i.e., the four types of ratings of both officer and civilian actions), c indexes
the civilian action (1–22), f indexes the officer action (1–22), ` denotes the participant’s
legitimacy beliefs, γ denotes the estimated civilian-action scale value, and χ denotes the
estimated officer-action scale value. Each of the β variables is an estimated regression co-
efficient. Equation (3) arranges the terms in a traditional form that accentuates multiplica-
tive interaction terms, while Equation (2) arranges the terms to emphasize the conceptual
framework of the model: A rating is generated from a baseline plus a weighted influence of
the civilian action plus a weighted influence of the officer action, with the weightings and
baseline modulated by the legitimacy beliefs (`) of the participant, and by the interaction
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of civilian and officer action severities.
To aid interpretation of Equation (2), consider rating the acceptability of officer actions,
so yˆ is the predicted acceptability rating. Intuitively, as officer actions χf become more se-
vere, their acceptability should decline, and so the coefficient β2 should be negative. The
magnitude of this decline might be modulated by the respondent’s legitimacy beliefs `: it
might be the case that respondents with high ` would be more accepting of severe officer
actions, meaning that coefficient β5 might be positive. Analogously, as civilian actions γc
become more severe, the acceptability of severe officer actions should increase, meaning
that coefficient β1 should be positive. It might be the case that respondents with high legiti-
macy beliefs ` should be more sensitive to civilian action severity, meaning that coefficient
β4 might be positive. Additionally, the rate at which officer action acceptability declines as
officer action severity increases should be greater for low severity civilian actions than it is
for high severity civilian actions. That is, intuitively, officer acceptability should decrease
less rapidly when the civilian action is very severe compared to when it is not severe, mean-
ing that coefficient β6 should be positive. Finally, the baseline acceptability is established
by the intercept, β0, which might be higher for respondents with higher legitimacy beliefs
`, that is, coefficient β3 might be positive.
The ratings for moral evaluations (i.e., acceptability, appropriateness, and punishability)
were modeled together using the same estimated latent scale values for the actions, but
separately from the ratings for physical evaluations (i.e., force) which had its own estimated
latent scale values for the actions. This separation was made a priori because we assumed
that the scale value for the physical force of an action might be quite different than the scale
value for the moral severity of an action. Estimated scale values are discussed at length in
Celestin and Kruschke (2019a).
We made the conventional assumption that ratings were normally distributed around the
predicted value in Equation 2, with distinct standard deviation σq for each type of question.
57
The data were reasonably normal because of our logit transformation and censoring.
Several variations of the model were also considered. In one variation, we added nega-
tive experience with police as a predictor, including an interaction term for both officer and
civilian actions. In another variation, we removed legitimacy beliefs ` as a predictor and re-
placed it with negative experience with police, again including interaction terms. In yet an-
other variation, we added participant sex, race, and political affiliation, as well as negative
experiences with police as predictors. All of these models yielded estimates that reflected
weak or non-existent effects and showed increased uncertainty in the parameter estimates
as a result of including additional predictors. Moreover, any effects that were present were
unreliable across dependent measures. For these reasons, we are not confident that any
effects observed for these additional individual difference measures represent meaningful
effects in reality. Importantly, the inclusion of these additional predictors did not sub-
stantively alter the conclusions we present here. Thus, the analyses we present reflect the
model of Equation 2. However, see the supplementary materials (https://osf.io/h6jg3) for
additional results from the model variations.
Bayesian Methods. We used Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters Kruschke
(2015); Kruschke and Liddell (2018a, 2018b). Bayesian analysis produces a joint proba-
bility distribution across all the model parameters, including all regression coefficients and
latent scale values. This probability distribution is called a “posterior” distribution because
it represents the credibilities of parameter values after taking the data into account. The
posterior distribution on a parameter is summarized by its most probable value (i.e., its
mode) and the interval that spans the 95% most probable values, referred to as the 95%
highest density intervals (HDI). The width of an HDI represents the uncertainty of the
parameter’s estimate, so smaller HDIs reflect greater precision.
A unique element of Bayesian analysis is that it requires establishing prior probability
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distributions for every estimated parameter. We chose priors which were diffuse in relation
to the scale of the data, ensuring that our prior choices had very little influence on the
posterior estimates.
We coded and calculated all of our models using the programming language R and
JAGS software (Plummer, 2003) via the runjags package (Denwood, 2016). All MCMC
chains exhibited convergence, and the effective sample size for our parameter chains ap-
proaches 10, 000.
Estimates of regression coefficients
The modal posterior estimates for all of the regression coefficients, and their 95% HDIs,
are presented in Table 4. As an example, recall from our previous discussion after introduc-
ing Equation 2 that intuition suggests the coefficient β2 for acceptability of officer action
should be negative because the acceptability of actions should decline as their severity goes
up. Table 4 shows that the estimated value of β2 for acceptability of officer actions is in fact
strongly negative. The value of the coefficient is how much the predicted rating changes
(on the logit transformed scale) when the action severity changes by one unit on its scale
anchored at 1.0 for the least severe action and 6.0 for the most severe action. Graphical
representations of the coefficients are presented in the following sections.
[Blank space intentionally inserted for readability of subsequent sections.]
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Parameter Question Posterior Mode (95% HDI)
β0 punish, officer action −1.57(−1.74,−1.41)
β1 punish, officer action −1.13(−1.19,−1.07)
β2 punish, officer action 1.59(1.52, 1.67)
β3 punish, officer action −0.51(−0.58,−0.44)
β4 punish, officer action 0.01(−0.04, 0.06)
β5 punish, officer action −0.03(−0.08, 0.03)
β6 punish, officer action −0.28(−0.32,−0.25)
σ punish, officer action 2.31(2.25, 2.37)
β0 acceptable, officer action 0.45(0.30, 0.61)
β1 acceptable, officer action 1.21(1.14, 1.27)
β2 acceptable, officer action −1.38(−1.45,−1.30)
β3 acceptable, officer action 0.50(0.42, 0.57)
β4 acceptable, officer action 0.04(−0.02, 0.09)
β5 acceptable, officer action 0.05(0.00, 0.10)
β6 acceptable, officer action 0.41(0.36, 0.45)
σ acceptable, officer action 2.54(2.48, 2.60)
β0 appropriate, officer action 0.42(0.34, 0.49)
β1 appropriate, officer action −0.53(−0.56,−0.5)
β2 appropriate, officer action 0.69(0.66, 0.73)
β3 appropriate, officer action −0.07(−0.11,−0.03)
β4 appropriate, officer action −0.03(−0.05, 0.01)
β5 appropriate, officer action 0.06(0.03, 0.09)
β6 appropriate, officer action 0.02(0, 0.04)
σ appropriate, officer action 1.58(1.55, 1.62)
β0 force, officer action 0.06(−0.09, 0.21)
β1 force, officer action −0.22(−0.25,−0.2)
β2 force, officer action 1.6(1.54, 1.67)
β3 force, officer action −0.09(−0.13,−0.05)
β4 force, officer action 0.04(0.01, 0.06)
β5 force, officer action 0.08(0.05, 0.11)
β6 force, officer action −0.02(−0.04, 0)
σ force, officer action 1.35(1.32, 1.38)
β0 punish, civilian action −0.86(−0.98,−0.73)
β1 punish, civilian action 1.72(1.67, 1.78)
β2 punish, civilian action −0.43(−0.46,−0.39)
β3 punish, civilian action 0.38(0.33, 0.44)
β4 punish, civilian action 0.11(0.07, 0.16)
β5 punish, civilian action 0.08(0.04, 0.11)
β6 punish, civilian action −0.12(−0.15,−0.09)
σ punish, civilian action 1.7(1.66, 1.74)
β0 acceptable, civilian action −0.29(−0.42,−0.17)
β1 acceptable, civilian action −1.56(−1.63,−1.51)
β2 acceptable, civilian action 0.62(0.57, 0.66)
β3 acceptable, civilian action −0.51(−0.58,−0.45)
β4 acceptable, civilian action −0.15(−0.2,−0.11)
β5 acceptable, civilian action −0.03(−0.07, 0.01)
β6 acceptable, civilian action 0.21(0.18, 0.25)
σ acceptable, civilian action 2.13(2.08, 2.18)
β0 appropriate, civilian action 0.49(0.42, 0.56)
β1 appropriate, civilian action 0.69(0.66, 0.73)
β2 appropriate, civilian action −0.33(−0.36,−0.3)
β3 appropriate, civilian action 0.22(0.17, 0.27)
β4 appropriate, civilian action 0.08(0.05, 0.12)
β5 appropriate, civilian action 0.03(0, 0.07)
β6 appropriate, civilian action −0.02(−0.04, 0.01)
σ appropriate, civilian action 1.8(1.77, 1.84)
β0 force, civilian action −0.19(−0.33,−0.04)
β1 force, civilian action 1.58(1.52, 1.64)
β2 force, civilian action −0.15(−0.18,−0.13)
β3 force, civilian action 0.05(0.01, 0.09)
β4 force, civilian action 0.12(0.09, 0.15)
β5 force, civilian action 0.04(0.01, 0.07)
β6 force, civilian action −0.02(−0.04, 0)
σ force, civilian action 1.36(1.33, 1.39)
Table 4
Parameter estimates for the regression model of Equation 2. HDI = highest density inter-
val.
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Figure 9. Regression model trend lines for officer punishment ratings. punishOff = pun-
ishability rating of officer action. Solid purple lines denote the least severe civilian actions,
and dot-dash red lines denote the most severe civilian actions.
Officer punishment ratings. The model’s trend lines for officer punishment are plot-
ted in Figure 9. There are two panels in Figure 9, with the left panel showing model trend
for participants with very low legitimacy belief (` = −2) and the right panel showing model
trend for participants with very high legitimacy belief (` = +2). In each panel, the vertical
axis is the logit transformed rating, where 0 on the logit transformed scale corresponds to
50 on the original rating scale, and −4 and +4 on the transformed scale correspond to ap-
proximately 2 and 98, respectively, on the original rating scale. The horizontal axis is the
latent action severity, where 1.0 is anchored at the least severe action and 6.0 is anchored
at the most severe action. The “rug plot” along the horizontal axis (i.e., the small vertical
lines) indicates the estimated scale values of the 22 officer actions (i.e., modal posterior χ
from Eq. 2, reported in Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a), with their SOLOF categories coded
by color line type. The main body of the panels plot a separate line for each civilian action.
The trend lines in Figure 9 show the punishability of officer actions. Notice that the
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lines go up, indicating that punishability increases as officer action severity increases. The
slope of the lines is the slope coefficient on officer-action severity from Equation 2, namely
β2 + β5 · ` + β6 · γ, using ` = −2 in the left panel and ` = +2 in the right panel. Table 4
shows that β2 for punishability of officer action is indeed positive, with a posterior mode
of +1.59 (and 95% HDI from 1.52 to 1.67). Table 4 shows that β5 for punishability of
officer action had a posterior mode of nearly zero (with an HDI including zero), which
means that the slope for punishability is essentially unaffected by a participant’s legitimacy
belief, and therefore the slopes of the lines in the two panels of Figure 9 are visually very
similar. However, the interaction between civilian and officer action severity controlled by
regression coefficient β6 had a negative posterior mode of−0.28 (and 95% HDI from−0.32
to −0.25). This indicates that the rate at which officer punishment increases as officer
action severity increases, changes (i.e., decreases) as civilian action severity increases. This
interaction is visible in both panels of Figure 9 by observing the fan of non-parallel lines,
that is, that the slope of low-severity civilian actions is much steeper than the slope of
high-severity civilian actions.
In Figure 9 there is a separate line for each civilian action, and the intercept of each
line is given by Equation 2 as (β0,q + β3 · `) + (β1 + β4 · `) · γ where γ is the latent
severity of the civilian action (for discussion of the values of γ see Celestin & Kruschke,
2019a). Intuitively, as a civilian action becomes more severe, any specific officer reaction
should be less punishable, suggesting that β1 should be negative. Indeed, Table 4 shows
that β1 had a posterior mode of −1.13 (with 95% HDI from −1.19 to −1.07). The large
magnitude of β1 is represented visually in Figure 9 by the large spread between the lines.
Note that the highest lines are the least severe civilian actions (hence an officer re-action is
more punishable) and the lowest lines are the most severe civilian actions (hence an officer
re-action is less punishable).
Visually comparing the two panels of Figure 9 suggests that the main influence of le-
62
gitimacy beliefs is the overall rating of punishability; that is, the lines in the ` = −2 panel
are higher than the lines in the ` = +2 panel. In other words, participants with very low
legitimacy beliefs tended to rate officer actions as much more punishable than participants
with very high legitimacy beliefs. The regression coefficient that controls the overall level
as a function of ` is β3, which had a posterior mode of −0.51 (with 95% HDI from −0.58
to −0.44). In particular, notice that when officer actions are most severe, the lines in the
` = −2 panel representing all of the physical but non-lethal actions, as well as two of the
lethal action lines, fall above the 0 midpoint. In contrast, all of the physical but non-lethal
and the lethal action lines fall below the midpoint in in the ` = +2 panel.
Figure 10. Regression model trend lines for officer acceptability ratings. acceptableOff =
acceptability rating of officer action. Comp = completely. Solid purple lines denote the
least severe civilian actions, and dot-dash red lines denote the most severe civilian actions.
Officer acceptability ratings. Acceptability ratings for officer actions showed an in-
verse pattern relative to punishment. This makes intuitive sense, as more punishable actions
should be less acceptable. The trend lines for acceptability of officer action are plotted in
Figure 10. Acceptability declines as action severity increases; the coefficient β2 had a
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posterior mode of −1.20 (with 95% HDI from −1.27 to −1.14). The decline is virtually
unaffected by legitimacy beliefs as coefficient β5 is very near zero (with an HDI including
zero), meaning that the slopes of the lines are nearly the same in the two panels of Fig-
ure 10. However, the interaction between civilian and officer action severity controlled by
regression coefficient β6 had a positive posterior mode of 0.41 (and 95% HDI from 0.36
to 0.45). This indicates that as civilian action severity increases, acceptability judgments
of officer actions decrease less steeply when officer actions become more severe. This in-
teraction is visible in both panels of Figure 9 by observing that the slope of low-severity
civilian actions (i.e., the purple solid lines) is much steeper than the slope of high-severity
civilian actions (i.e., the red dot-dash lines).
Acceptability of officer reactions increased with the severity of the preceding civilian
action. This can be seen in Figure 10 as the spread between the lines representing different
civilian actions, with the solid (purple) lines for mild actions well below the dash-dot (red)
lines of lethal actions. The regression coefficient β1 had a posterior mode of 1.21 (with
95% HDI from 1.14 to 1.27). The regression coefficient β4 was nearly zero, meaning that
the effect of civilian action was similar across the range of legitimacy beliefs.
The primary influence of legitimacy can be seen in the overall height of the lines across
panels: acceptability of officer action tends to be higher for high legitimacy than for low
legitimacy. The regression coefficient β3 had a posterior mode of 0.50 (with 95% HDI
from 0.42 to 0.57) indicating that rated acceptability of officers increased as legitimacy `
increased.
Notice in the left panel of Figure 10, for participants with very low legitimacy beliefs,
officer actions at SOLOF level 6 (above 5.0 on the latent severity scale) are rated as some-
what unacceptable (i.e., two are below the 0 midline, and two just above it) even when the
civilian actions are also lethal. By contrast, in the right panel, for participants with very
high legitimacy beliefs, lethal officer actions are acceptable, well above the midline, when
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civilian actions are also lethal. This suggests that there may be a willingness among people
with high legitimacy beliefs to accept lethal officer force as a viable response to lethal civil-
ian force, but people with low legitimacy beliefs may rarely view lethal force as acceptable,
even when they are confronting very severe civilian actions.
Figure 11. Regression model trend lines for officer appropriateness ratings. appropriateOff
= appropriateness rating of officer action. Solid purple lines denote the least severe civilian
actions, and dot-dash red lines denote the most severe civilian actions.
Officer appropriateness ratings. Recall that for appropriateness of an action, the re-
sponse slider was labeled “appropriate” at its midpoint, “insufficient” at its low end, and
“excessive” at its high end. Therefore an increase on this scale is not always an increase in
appropriateness, because an increase on the high end of the scale is actually away from ap-
propriate and toward excessive. Figure 11 has a horizontal dotted line marking the midpoint
of the scale, that is, ratings at the point labeled “appropriate.” Trend lines for appropriatenss
of officer action are plotted in Figure 11. The lines increase as officer action severity in-
creases, meaning that ratings transition from insufficient through appropriate to excessive
as officer actions become more severe. The regression coefficient β2 had a posterior mode
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of 0.69 (with 95% HDI from 0.66 to 0.73).
The regression coefficient on civilian-action severity, β1, had a posterior mode of−0.53
(with 95% HDI from −0.56 to −0.50), indicating that ratings of officer appropriateness
transitioned from excessive to appropriate to insufficient as civilian-action severity in-
creased. The negative regression coefficient is reflected in Figure 11 by the decreasing
intercepts of the the civilian-action lines as they become more severe.
Intriguingly, visual inspection of Figure 11 indicates that lethal officer actions tended
to be rated on the excessive side of “appropriate.” That is, in both panels of Figure 11 the
trend lines for the most severe officer actions (scale values of 5.0 to 6.0 on the horizontal
axis) fall above the 0 midline, even when the civilian actions are also lethal (i.e., red dot-
dash lines). Thus, even when the civilian used lethal force, a lethal response by the officer
is rated toward excessive rather than squarely appropriate.
To further investigate this trend, we isolated the subset of trials in which the officer and
civilian actions exactly matched (or corresponded in the case of differing officer/civilian
actions). For example, matched trials for "handgunChest" would include only trials in
which the civilian and the officer both shot each other in the chest. We then modeled
ratings of officer appropriateness for each action while including legitimacy beliefs as a
covariate:
yˆa = α0,a + α1 ·` (4)
where yˆa is the predicted rating (logit transformed and censored) and where a (1–22) in-
dexes the action. This analysis yielded intercept coefficients (α0,a in Eqn. 4) that reflect the
estimated appropriateness rating for each action when legitimacy beliefs are at their mean
(recall that legitimacy beliefs are standardized, so 0 is the mean). Notice that this analysis
does not involve estimating latent action severities. See supplementary material for detailed
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analysis code and further details (https://osf.io/h6jg3).
Importantly, the appropriateness question was unique among our dependent measures
in that it provided participants with a middle anchor labeled “appropriate” in addition to the
two end point anchors of “insufficient” and “excessive.” As a result, analyzing departures
from the midpoint is meaningful for this question, and matched actions would be expected
to fall exactly at the mid-point if participants general expectations are that officers should
be meeting civilian resistance with the same level of force.
Figure 12. Mean ratings of officer appropriateness using only matched civilian/officer ac-
tions (α0,a in Eqn. 4). Vertical segments show 95% HDI’s. Vertical axis shows ratings on
original scale, whereas analysis was performed on logit-transformed (and censored) rat-
ings. Actions on the horizontal axis are ordered according to their latent severity (Celestin
& Kruschke, 2019a). Symbols and colors indicate SOLOF level (as in Figure 7).
As seen in Figure 12, appropriateness ratings for low-force actions fall very close to the
midpoint of the scale. However, as actions become more severe (toward the right side of
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Figure 12), the predicted rating falls toward the excessive side of the scale. That is, even
when the officer responds with the same action as the civilian, physically forceful officer
actions still tend to be rated as somewhat excessive. In particular, the officer reactions rated
as especially excessive include headButt, punchFace, headSlam, and vehicle, even in re-
sponse to the identical action by the civilian. These actions are not intuitively normative
for police officers, and therefore may be judged to be particularly excessive. On the other
hand, it is normative for police officers to use their officially-issued hand gun, which may
explain why handgunChest and handgunHead have mean ratings near the “appropriate”
midline. An unexpected result in Figure 12 is that handcuff is rated as excessive, despite
it being a normative police action. We believe this result is idiosyncratic for the particular
matched civilian action, pulling away. Whereas pulling away has physical force compara-
ble to handcuffing, pulling away by itself may seem not to merit handcuffing. Celestin and
Kruschke (2019a) discuss the normativity of actions in terms of the estimated scale values
of the actions.
Overall, this matched-action analysis is largely congruent with the primary analysis
and suggests that lay evaluators may judge an officer reaction that matches a civilian action
to be somewhat excessive. However, there are some inconsistencies between analyses. In
Figure 11, all four lethal-action lines seem to fall above the midpoint at their matched action
rug-plot points, and to roughly the same extent. This contrasts with the result in Figure 12
where the two gun-related actions fall closer to the midpoint. A second discrepancy is
visible in the regression lines of Figure 11 which suggest that the ratings for handcuffing (in
response to the matched civilian action "pullingAway") should be roughly at the midpoint
or slightly below (depending on `); this stands in contrast to Figure 12 which indicates
that handcuffing falls above the midline. These discrepancies result from the flexibility of
Equation 4 relative to the more restrictive linearity of Equation 3. On the other hand, the
analysis of matched actions involved only a small subset of data, while the full regression
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analysis involved all the data. The general trend of physically forceful officer actions being
rated on the excessive side of appropriate remains supported by both analyses.
Returning now to the primary analysis in Figure 11, the effect of legitimacy beliefs can
be discerned from visual comparison of the two panels in Figure 11. At the right edges
of the two panels, the trend lines rise to approximately the same heights of excessiveness.
But at the left edges of the two panels, the trend lines are lower, toward “insufficient,” for
the high-legitimacy panel. That is, participants with very high legitimacy beliefs tended to
rate mild officer actions as more insufficient than participants with very low legitimacy be-
liefs. This difference between panels is expressed mathematically by the combined effects
of the regression coefficients involving legitimacy. The coefficient β3 had a posterior mode
of −0.07 (with 95% HDI from −0.11 to −0.03) indicating that higher legitimacy partici-
pants tended to have lower ratings overall (i.e., more insufficient, less excessive), but the
coefficient β5 had a posterior mode of 0.06 (with 95% HDI from 0.03 to 0.09) indicating
that higher legitimacy participants tended to have steeper slopes on officer severity. The
combined effect of the coefficients is that high-legitimacy participants tend to rate mild
officer actions as more insufficient than low-legitimacy participants (left edge of the pan-
els), but high-legitimacy participants tend to rate severe officer actions about the same as
low-legitimacy participants (right edge of the panels). The interaction of civilian and of-
ficer action severity represented by the β6 coefficient was close to zero with an HDI that
included zero, indicating that appropriateness ratings changed at a consistent rate across
actions.
Officer force ratings. The trend lines for ratings of the forcefulness of an officer
reaction are plotted in Figure 13. Perhaps the most prominent feature of the graphs, in
contrast to previous graphs, is that the lines for different civilian actions are close together,
especially for participants with high legitimacy (right panel). This dense packing of the
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Figure 13. Regression model trend lines for officer force ratings. forceOff = force rating of
officer action. Solid purple lines denote the least severe civilian actions, and dot-dash red
lines denote the most severe civilian actions.
lines makes intuitive sense: The physical forcefulness of an action is inherent in the action
itself, regardless of what may have happened before the action. The small separation of
the lines is determined mathematically by the value of regression coefficient β1, which
had a posterior mode of only −0.22 (95% HDI from −0.25 to −0.20). The negative sign
indicates that people rated the physical forcefulness of an officer reaction less severely
as the civilian-action severity increased. But the rate of decline was small compared to
moral ratings (cf. for punishment β1 = −1.13). The slope on civilian-action severity was
modulated slightly by legitimacy beliefs, as can be seen in the tighter packing of the lines
for high legitimacy (right panel) than for low legitimacy (left panel). This interaction with
legitimacy is governed mathematically by regression coefficient β4, which had a posterior
mode of 0.04 (and 95% HDI from 0.01 to 0.06).
Legitimacy also had small modulating effects on the baseline and slope with respect to
officer-action severity. The baseline decreased slightly as legitimacy beliefs increased, with
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β3 having a posterior mode of−0.09 (and 95% HDI from−0.13 to−0.05). Simultaneously,
the slope on officer-action severity increased slightly as legitimacy belief increased, with
β5 having a posterior mode of 0.08 (and 95% HDI from 0.05 to 0.11). Together, these
influences of legitimacy are most noticeable at the left edges of the panels in Figure 13:
participants with low legitmacy beliefs tended to rate mild officer actions as having a bit
more forcefulness than the ratings from participants with high legitimacy beliefs.
Summary of officer action ratings. Punishment ratings increased as officer-action
severity increased, and punishment ratings decreased as civilian-action severity increased.
Consistent with those trends, acceptability ratings lessened as officer actions became more
severe, while acceptability ratings escalated as civilian actions became more severe. Pun-
ishment and acceptability ratings were modulated by the interaction of civilian and officer
actions such that they increased/decreased at greater rates when civilian actions were less
severe. Therefore, participants were judging the moral aspects of officer actions in the
context of the preceding civilian action.
As participant legitimacy beliefs increased, overall punishment ratings decreased and
acceptability ratings increased. Notably, participants with very low legitimacy beliefs
viewed lethal officer actions as unacceptable even when the civilian actions were also lethal.
This finding suggests it is possible that lethal force is not viewed as a viable police response
for people with very low legitimacy beliefs about police.
With respect to ratings of appropriateness, lethal force by an officer was viewed as
slightly excessive even after lethal civilian force and regardless of participants’ legitimacy
beliefs. On the other hand, participants with high legitimacy beliefs tended to rate mild
officer reactions as insufficient more than participants with low legitimacy beliefs.
Finally, perceived physical force of officer actions increased with action severity, but
decreased slightly as civilian actions became more severe. In principle, a judgment of an
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action’s physical forcefulness should depend only on the action itself and not on any pre-
ceding action. The participants in these studies showed an influence of the preceding action,
with low-legitimacy participants showing a slightly larger influence, but the influence was
much smaller than in the ratings of moral consequences.
Figure 14. Regression model trend lines for civilian punishment ratings. punishCiv =
punishability rating of civilian action. Notice the horizontal axis is officer action severity.
Solid purple lines denote the least severe civilian actions, and dot-dash red lines denote the
most severe civilian actions.
Civilian punishment ratings. Trend lines for punishment ratings of civilian actions
(after a preceding officer action) are plotted in Figure 14. Notice that the horizontal axis
continues to represent officer action severity, as in previous graphs. And, as before, the
effect of civilian action severity is represented by the spread between the lines for different
civilian actions. In can be seen in both panels of Figure 14 that the lines are quite spread
out, indicating a large influence of civilian-action severity on the punishability of the action.
Regression coefficient β1 had a posterior mode of 1.72 (95% HDI from 1.67 to 1.78).
Moreover, the spread of the lines is larger as legitimacy beliefs increase; coefficient β4 had
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a posterior mode of 0.11 (95% HDI from 0.07 to 0.16).
In both panels of Figure 14 the lines descend, indicating that the punishability of a
civilian action declines as the severity of the preceding officer action increases. This decline
is captured by coefficient β2 which had a posterior mode of −0.43 (and 95% HDI from
−0.46 to −0.39). Interestingly, the magnitude of the decline depended on the legitimacy
belief of the participant, with low-legitimacy beliefs (left panel of Figure 14) endorsing
a steeper decline in punishability than high-legitimacy beliefs (right panel of Figure 14).
This change in slopes is captured by coefficient β5 which had a posterior mode of 0.08
(95% HDI from 0.04 to 0.11).
The interaction between civilian and officer action severity controlled by regression
coefficient β6 had a negative posterior mode of−0.12 (and 95% HDI from−0.15 to−0.09).
This indicates that as officer action severity increases, punishments judgments of civilian
actions increase less steeply when officer actions are more severe. This interaction is visible
in both panels of Figure 14 by noticing that the slope of low-severity civilian actions (i.e.,
the purple solid lines) is much less steep than the slope of high-severity civilian actions
(i.e., the red dot-dash lines).
Visual inspection of the two panels of Figure 14 also suggests that punishment ratings
tended to be higher overall for participants with high legitimacy beliefs. This is robustly
verified by the regression coefficient β3 which had a posterior mode of 0.38 (and 95% HDI
from 0.33 to 0.44).
It is interesting that the influence of legitimacy on baseline punishability is almost as
strong (in magnitude) for ratings of civilian actions as for officer actions (i.e., β3 = 0.38
for civilian actions and β3 = −0.51 for officer actions). Moreover, the influence of legiti-
macy on the effect of civilian action severity is stronger for ratings of civilian punishability
than ratings of officer punishability (i.e., β4 = 0.11 for civilian actions and β4 = −0.01
for officer actions), and the influence of legitimacy on the effect of officer action severity
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is stronger for ratings of civilian punishability than ratings of officer punishability (i.e.,
β5 = 0.08 for civilian actions and β5 = −0.03 for officer actions). The differences in mag-
nitudes of the β4 and β5 coefficients across civilian and officer ratings are marginal, but
similar trends appear in judgments of acceptability and appropriateness. In other words,
the influence of legitimacy is at least as strong for judgments of civilian reactions to police
as for judgments of police reactions to civilians.
Figure 15. Regression model trend lines for civilian acceptability ratings. acceptableCiv =
acceptability rating of civilian action. Notice the horizontal axis is officer action severity.
Solid purple lines denote the least severe civilian actions, and dot-dash red lines denote the
most severe civilian actions.
Civilian acceptability ratings. Acceptability ratings of civilian actions were consis-
tent with punishment ratings: the patterns were inverses of each other. Trend lines for
acceptability ratings of civilian actions (i.e., reactions to officer actions) are shown in Fig-
ure 15. Again the lines are quite spread out, indicating a large influence of civilian-action
severity on the acceptability of the action. Regression coefficient β1 had a posterior mode of
−1.56 (95% HDI from −1.63 to −1.51). Moreover, the spread of the lines is larger (more
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negative) as legitimacy beliefs increase; coefficient β4 had a posterior mode of −0.15 (95%
HDI from −0.20 to −0.11).
In both panels of Figure 15 the lines ascend, indicating that the acceptability of a civilian
action increases as the severity of the preceding officer action increases. This increase is
captured by coefficient β2 which had a posterior mode of 0.62 (95% HDI from 0.57 to 0.66).
There is marginal evidence that the magnitude of the increase depended on the legitimacy
belief of the participant, with low-legitimacy beliefs (left panel of Figure 15) endorsing
a steeper increase in acceptability than high-legitimacy beliefs (right panel of Figure 15).
This change in slope is captured by coefficient β5 which had a posterior mode of −0.03
(95% HDI from −0.07 to 0.01).
The interaction between civilian and officer action severity controlled by regression
coefficient β6 had a positive posterior mode of 0.21 (and 95% HDI from 0.18 to 0.25). This
indicates that as officer action severity increases, acceptibility judgments of low severity
civilian actions increases only slightly (if at all), while acceptability of more severe civilian
actions increases much more. This interaction is visible in both panels of Figure 14 by
noticing that the slope of low-severity civilian actions (i.e., the purple solid lines) is much
less steep than the slope of high-severity civilian actions (i.e., the red dot-dash lines).
Visual inspection of the two panels of Figure 15 also suggests that ratings of acceptabil-
ity of civilian actions tended to be lower overall for participants with high police-legitimacy
beliefs. This is robustly verified by the regression coefficient β3 which had a posterior mode
of −0.53 (95% HDI from −0.59 to −0.46).
The influence of legitimacy on baseline acceptability is as strong (in magnitude) for
civilian actions as for officer actions (i.e., β3 = −0.50 for civilian actions and β3 = 0.51
for officer actions). Moreover, the influence of legitimacy on the effect of civilian action
severity is stronger for ratings of civilian acceptability than ratings of officer acceptability
(i.e., β4 = −0.15 for civilian actions and β4 = 0.04 for officer actions), and the influence
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of legitimacy on the effect of officer action severity is no weaker for ratings of civilian
acceptability than ratings of officer acceptability (i.e., β5 = −0.03 for civilian actions
and β5 = 0.05 for officer actions, HDIs both include 0). In other words, the influence of
legitimacy is at least as strong for judgments of civilian reactions to police as for judgments
of police reactions to civilians.
Interestingly, the severe civilian action lines in the low legitimacy panel (`− 2) appear
well above the midpoint of acceptability when officer action severity is high, while they re-
main well below the midpoint even at extreme officer severity levels in the high legitimacy
panel (`+2). That is, the right panel of Figure 15 shows that for participants with the high-
est legitimacy beliefs, violent civilian actions are not acceptable even when in response to
lethal officer actions. In contrast, participants with the lowest legitimacy beliefs rate lethal
civilian actions well above the acceptability midpoint when officer actions are lethal.
Figure 16. Regression model trend lines for civilian appropriateness ratings. appropriate-
Civ = appropriateness rating of civilian action. Notice the horizontal axis is officer action
severity. Solid purple lines denote the least severe civilian actions, and dot-dash red lines
denote the most severe civilian actions.
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Civilian appropriateness ratings. The trend lines for appropriateness of civilian ac-
tion are plotted in Figure 16. Recall that the anchors for the response scale went from
“insufficient” through “appropriate” to “excessive.” The regression coefficient on civilian
action, β1, had a posterior mode of 0.69 (with 95% HDI from 0.66 to 0.73), indicating
that judgments of civilian action transitioned from insufficient to appropriate to excessive
as their severity increased. This slope on civilian action depended on legitimacy belief, as
coefficient β4 had a posterior mode of 0.08 (with 95% HDI from 0.05 to 0.12). This effect
can be seen by comparing the two panels of Figure 16, in which the lines are more spread
out for ` = +2 than for ` = −2.
Ratings declined with the severity of the preceding officer action, as shown by the
descending lines in Figure 16. Coefficient β2 had a posterior mode of −0.33 (with 95%
HDI from −0.36 to −0.30). The slope of the lines did not depend much on legitimacy (β5
had a posterior mode of 0.03 with 95% HDI from 0.00 to 0.07), as can be seen by the only
subtle change in slope across panels.
Perhaps the most prominent feature of Figure 16 is that severe civilian actions (dash-dot
red lines) tend to be rated toward excessive (above the midline) for very-high legitimacy
respondents, even when the preceding officer action is also severe. But severe civilian
actions (dash-dot red lines) tend to be rated as appropriate (near the midline) for very-low
legitimacy respondents when the preceding officer action is also severe. This difference is
captured in part by the overall influence of legitimacy on the intercept, given by coefficient
β3, which had a posterior mode of 0.22 (with 95% HDI from 0.17 to 0.27). The effect of
legitimacy on baseline appropriateness is stronger for judgments of civilian actions than
for judgments of officer actions (β3 = 0.22 for civilian actions and β3 = −0.07 for officer
actions).
We also analyzed responses to matched civilian reactions, just as we did for officer
reactions in Equation 4. Figure 17 plots the intercept estimates of the model, which indicate
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Figure 17. Mean ratings of civilian appropriateness using only matched civilian/officer
actions. Vertical segments show 95% HDI’s. Vertical axis shows ratings on original scale,
whereas analysis was performed on logit-transformed (and censored) ratings. Actions on
the horizontal axis are ordered according to their latent severity (Celestin & Kruschke,
2019a). Symbols and colors indicate SOLOF level (as in Figure 7).
the predicted appropriateness rating at mean legitimacy (` = 0) for each civilian action. It
is clear in Figure 17 that the majority of civilian actions fall above the appropriateness
midpoint toward the excessive end of the scale, with the more severe civilian actions being
closer to the excessive end of the scale.
A visual comparison of Figures 12 and 17 shows that the rated excessiveness of officer
matched reactions tends not to be as extreme as civilian matched reactions. We suspect
this difference arises from different expectations of police and civilian behavior. Police
are legally authorized to use force but civilians are rarely authorized to use force against
police. That is, any violent civilian action is excessive by default unless accompanied by
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some additional justification.
Figure 18. Regression model trend lines for civilian force ratings. forceCiv = force rating of
civilian action. Notice the horizontal axis is officer action severity. Solid purple lines denote
the least severe civilian actions, and dot-dash red lines denote the most severe civilian
actions.
Civilian force ratings. Trend lines for ratings of forcefulness of civilian action are
shown in Figure 18. As indicated by large spread between lines, there was a strong influ-
ence of civilian action severity, with β1 having a posterior mode of 1.58 (and 95% HDI
from 1.52 to 1.64). The spread grew somewhat with legitimacy, as β4 had a posterior mode
of 0.12 (with 95% HDI from 0.09 to 0.15).
The overall ratings of civilian force increased slightly with legitimacy, as β3 had a
posterior mode of 0.05 (with 95% HDI from 0.01 to 0.09). This can be discerned visually
in Figure 18 by the subtle overall increase in the height of lines in the right panel relative
to the left panel.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the civilian force ratings is that they depend (to a
small degree) on the preceding officer action. The trend lines in Figure 18 descend; coeffi-
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cient β2 had a posterior mode of −0.15 (with 95% HDI from −0.18 to −0.13). Notice that
the magnitude of the influence of preceding action on this physical attribute is far smaller
than for moral attributes. Interestingly, the influence of the preceding officer action is less
for high-legitimacy participants than for low-legitimacy participants (β5 had a posterior
mode of 0.04 with 95% HDI from 0.01 to 0.07), as can be seen in Figure 18 by the less
steep lines in the right panel.
Summary of civilian action ratings. Ratings of civilian punishment decreased as the
severity of preceding officer action increased, but this decrease was stronger for participants
with low legitimacy beliefs.
Acceptability of civilian action increased as the severity of preceding officer action in-
creased, and this increase was stronger for participants with low legitimacy beliefs. Partici-
pants with very high legitimacy beliefs tended to rate severe civilian actions as unacceptable
even when preceded by a severe officer action, unlike participants with low legitimacy be-
liefs. Civilian punishment and acceptability ratings were modulated by the interaction of
civilian and officer actions such that they decreased and increased, respectively, at greater
rates when civilian actions were more severe. That is, low-severity civilian actions are al-
ways highly acceptable and not deserving of punishment, but high-severity civilian actions
become much more acceptable and much less deserving of punishment as officer actions
become severe—especially for participants with low legitimacy beliefs.
Appropriateness of civilian action went from insufficient to excessive as action severity
increased, but had the reverse trend as officer action severity increased. Participants with
very high legitimacy beliefs tended to rate severe civilian actions as excessive even when
preceded by a severe officer action, unlike participants with low legitimacy beliefs.
In general, the influence of legitimacy beliefs was just as strong on ratings of civilian
reactions to police as on ratings of officer reactions to civilians. This is interesting because
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the questions for assaying legitimacy are explicitly focused on attitudes about police, not
about civilians.
Finally, perceived physical force of civilian actions depended to a small degree on the
severity of the preceding officer action, and this influence of officer action was stronger for
low-legitimacy participants.
Discussion and Conclusions
We measured lay evaluations of police and civilian use of force using a unique paradigm
incorporating actions from the complete range of law enforcement force options. The re-
sults provide a detailed view of the way lay observers make moral and physical evaluations
of representative police and civilian actions, and the effects of legitimacy beliefs on those
evaluations.
Results showed that as officer actions become more severe, they are viewed as more
physically forceful, and officer punishment and excessiveness ratings increase while ac-
ceptability ratings decrease. As civilian actions become more severe, they are also viewed
as more physically forceful, and civilian punishment and excessiveness ratings increase
while civilian acceptability ratings decrease. Moreover, both evaluations depend on the
severity of the preceding action, such that the severity of the preceding action increases ac-
ceptability and decreases punishability of subsequent severe actions. Evaluations of physi-
cal force also depend, to a lesser magnitude, on the severity of the preceding action.
Beyond these primary effects, individual differences in legitimacy beliefs altered both
moral and physical evaluations of officer and civilian violence. As legitimacy beliefs de-
creased, officer punishment ratings were higher and acceptability ratings were lower. Thus,
as one might expect, low legitimacy individuals are generally skeptical of the moral legit-
imacy of police use of force across the entire spectrum of actions (i.e., not only for ex-
treme police actions). Intriguingly, low-legitimacy individuals also exhibit increased per-
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ceptions of moral legitimacy for civilian violence, even for lethal actions, although the rate
of increace is attenuated relative to low-legitimacy individuals. Legitimacy beliefs also
affected judgments of physical force (though not as much as for moral judgments), with
low-legitimacy participants showing a stronger influence of preceding civilian action on
judgments of officer force, and a stronger influence of preceding officer action of judg-
ments of civilian force. The influence of legitimacy was just as strong for judgments of
civilian reactions to police as for judgments of police reactions to civilians.
One possible explanation for the tendency of legitimacy to increase the morality of
either police or civilian violence is that legitimacy shifts the extent to which each partic-
ipant in a police-civilian encounter is perceived as a moral agent deserving of judgment,
or a moral patient deserving of sympathy. Gray and Wegner (2009) proposed that moral
judgments possess a fundamental structure in which parties involved are pigeon holed into
either a perpetrator (agent) or a victim (patient), a process known as "moral typecasting"
(see also Gray, Schein, and Ward (2014) andSchein and Gray (2017)). Viewed in this light,
perhaps the inverse effects of legitimacy on police and civilian evaluations of violence re-
flect the tendency of low-legitimacy individuals to ascribe patiency primarily to citizens,
while high-legitimacy individuals ascribe patiency more to police. This proposed role of
moral typecasting is speculative and requires additional research.
From this rich array of results, perhaps the most surprising and important finding is that
ratings of lethal officer force are consistently on the “excessive” side of appropriate, even
when the preceding civilian action is also lethal, and even for high-legitimacy participants.
This result was demonstrated by the analysis involving simultaneous estimation of latent
scale values (see Figure 11) and by the analysis involving ratings of matched-severity ac-
tions (see Figure 12). The trend lines of Figure 11 suggest that when a preceding civilian
action is lethal (in SOLOF category 6), an officer response that is squarely “appropriate”
should be less severe, as low as SOLOF category 5 for low-legitimacy participants. Qual-
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ifying this general observation that lethal officer force always tends to be perceived as ex-
cessive are the observed differences in acceptability and punishment of officer and civilian
actions across different levels of participant legitimacy beliefs. Specifically, low-legitimacy
participants view civilian violence as acceptable and much less worthy of punishment when
officer actions become sufficiently severe, while high-legitimacy participants seem much
less willing to legitimate civilian violence. Importantly, these results demonstrate the need
to take both civilian and officer actions jointly into account when formulating models of
lay evaluations of police use of force, because the actions of both have meaningful effects
on judgments of punishment, acceptability, appropriateness, and even physical magnitude.
One reasonable conclusion from these results is that law-enforcement policies that al-
low officers to use force that matches or exceeds the severity of civilian resistance may
be perceived as excessive, even by lay observers with strong beliefs in the legitimacy of
police. It seems that lay observers expect police to react to civilian force with somewhat
less severity than the civilian force. This finding directly conflicts with typical policies
that license police officers to use somewhat greater force in order to quickly control the
situation, mitigate collateral harm, and achieve compliance. Attaining resolution between
police and civilian perspectives may require some combination of education and tuning
of use-of-force policy. Specifically, educating the public about SOLOF structure and the
need for "one-level-up" police heuristics may increase the extent that they are sufficiently
knowledgeable about the details of police policy and also convinced of the moral justifi-
ability of the current use-of-force models. Simultaneously, re-evaluation of SOLOF-style
categorization and accompanying heuristics by police policy-makers in order to empha-
size police reactions that maximize alignment with public expectations according to the
data we provide may prove useful. In the limit, attenuating the fundamental conflict we
observe between lay perceptions and police policy is likely to be a complicated pursuit.
Nevertheless, democratic principles demand that police decisions about appropriate levels
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of force have broad public support, and merging these two strategies (i.e., educating the
public and re-evaluation of current use-of-force policy) with the current results in mind
may be a good empirically-informed starting point to narrow the gap between police and
civilian perceptions of what constitutes legitimate police violence.
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Chapter 4: Lay evaluators expect police to use less force than civilians and more
normative force
Police use of force in the United States has been increasingly scrutinized in recent
years. Most notably, cases of lethal police-civilian encounters have been thrust into the
national spotlight (McWhorter, 2016), but public discourse regarding all levels of applied
force has become prominent, and a wide range of citizen objections have emerged as video
recording technology such as cell phone (civilian) and body-worn (police) cameras are now
commonplace in western society (Culhane et al., 2016). Incidents of police-civilian conflict
are now immediately and routinely broadcast across social media, and so the importance of
developing a scientific understanding of how lay observers evaluate forceful police actions
in relation to the way police and the criminal justice system approach force selection and
evaluation is acute. Nevertheless, very little empirical research has compared lay evalua-
tions with the methods police use to make choices about appropriate forceful actions.
Force Continua and Heuristic Rules
Over the past several decades, law enforcement agencies in the United States have de-
veloped a general protocol for categorizing forceful actions according to their assessed
severity. Specifically, actions are commonly sorted into rank-ordered bins and are situated
in relation to similar levels of civilian resistance (Terrill et al., 2003; Jefferis et al., 2011;
Terrill et al., 2011). These lists of actions sorted according to severity are commonly called
a “force continuum,” although we have previously referred to them as the six ordinal levels
of force (SOLOF) scale in order to highlight their ordinal nature. There is considerable
variety among different police agencies regarding many aspects of these scales, but more
than 80% of U.S. agencies employ them in some form, and the majority of U.S. agencies
use a six-level version (Terrill et al., 2011). Accompanying a SOLOF scale, police agencies
and educators frequently employ a heuristic rule dictating that officers may use one level of
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force above the corresponding level of civilian resistance in order to minimize the length of
conflict and risks to all involved in volatile situations, as well as to maximize the likelihood
of inducing compliance. All over the country, individual police officers are constantly us-
ing these tools (i.e., a SOLOF scale and the "one-above" rule) to make choices about which
forceful action to employ on the street. And yet, we are unaware of any systematic empir-
ical research that has investigated whether the moral intuitions of lay members of society
exhibit consensus with or divergence from these decision-making tools and practices. That
is, it is unknown what level of force severity citizens generally expect police to use in
response to subject resistance.
Action Normativity and Moral Severity
In prior work (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a, 2019b), we have developed precise scales
for the moral and physical magnitude of a representative set of forceful actions. These
scales reveal that some actions are perceived to be much more morally than forcefully
severe, while for other actions the inverted pattern is true. Intuitively, the actions that
are disproportionately morally severe are those that seem non-normative for police (e.g.,
slamming someone’s head into a curb), while actions that exhibit the inverted pattern seem
to be especially normative for police (e.g., handcuffing). Based on these findings, we have
hypothesized that role-normativity (i.e., the strength of unique association between a given
action and police) substantively drives moral evaluations of police use of force at the level
of decontextualized actions.
In the social psychology literature, the terms “norm” and “normativity” are frequently
used to describe social norms, but it has been rightfully pointed out that these terms are
somewhat ambiguous and can have multiple meanings (Shaffer, 1983). In particular, the
concept of normativity has been decomposed into two primary types of norms: injunctive
norms are those that reflect moral judgment and describe what people ought to do (i.e.,
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what is morally appropriate), while descriptive norms are those that reflect behavior that is
common or typical for others (i.e., what people actually do) (Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren,
1990). Both injunctive and descriptive norms occur in the context of specific groups or
settings. For example, it can be normative for grocery shoppers to return their carts to a
collection location when they are done unloading in the parking lot–both because it is what
they should do (i.e., injunctively normative) and/or because it is what most other people do
(i.e., descriptively normative). Violating social norms is often perceived by observers as a
moral violation, in part because norm violations are more informative regarding the mental
states and intentions of the violator than normative actions which are perceived as default
behaviors (Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010).
Congruent with our normativity hypothesis regarding police actions, previous research
has demonstrated the existence of a “common is moral” heuristic (Eriksson et al., 2014;
Lindström et al., 2018). Specifically, this research has found that people tend to infer the
morality of a social behavior according to its relative frequency, and that actions are judged
as more moral and merit less punishment when they are common than when they are rare.
Moreover, the findings of Eriksson et al. (2014) suggest that injunctive and descriptive
norms are not well distinguished psychologically, and that people frequently infer norma-
tive judgments from perceived descriptive norms and vice versa. For this reason, we use
the term “normativity” in a more general way that includes both injunctive and descriptive
meanings because the current research does not have a mechanism to distinguish descrip-
tive from injunctive normativity, and also because both types of normativity frequently
co-occur (Eriksson et al., 2014). Moreover, we believe it is likely that both are contributing
to the moral/physical severity discrepancies we observe for different police actions.
To our knowledge, no studies have extended the “common is moral” heuristic into the
domain of criminal justice. In particular, no prior research has directly assessed the extent
to which forceful actions are differentially associated with police or whether any observed
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differences are directly associated with differences in moral judgment. Thus, the current
studies are broadly designed to assess the level of force lay evaluators judge as appropri-
ate for police when responding to civilian resistance, and also to measure the differential
strength of association of different forceful actions with police and the relationship of those
normativities with previously observed discrepancies in moral severity judgments.
Method: Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c
All of the experiments presented here were approved by the Indiana University Institu-
tional Review Board in Bloomington, Indiana.
Participants
In Study 1a, we recruited 478 participants from the Indiana undergraduate subject pool.
377 of these participants passed experimental manipulation checks and were included in all
subsequent analyses. According to participant demographic responses, 268 were female,
108 male, and 1 participant selected other. There was 1 American Indian/Alaska Native
participant, 46 Asian participants, 22 Black or African American participants, 13 Hispanic
or Latino participants, 277 White participants, 17 participants who selected More than one,
and 1 participants who selected Unknown. Twenty eight participants identified as very
liberal, 93 as liberal, 48 as slightly liberal, 70 as moderate/middle of the road, 42 as slightly
conservative, 32 as conservative, 12 as very conservative, 37 as don’t know/not political,
11 as libertarian, and 4 as other.
In Study 1b, we recruited 553 participants from the Indiana undergraduate subject pool.
418 of these participants passed experimental manipulation checks and were included in all
subsequent analyses. According to participant demographic responses, 213 were female,
203 male, and 2 participant selected other. There were 47 Asian participants, 29 Black or
African American participants, 24 Hispanic or Latino participants, 292 White participants,
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Twenty four participants who selected More than one, 1 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific
Islander, and 1 participants who selected Unknown. Thirty one participants identified as
very liberal, 101 as liberal, 51 as slightly liberal, 69 as moderate/middle of the road, 39
as slightly conservative, 62 as conservative, 8 as very conservative, 41 as don’t know/not
political, 7 as libertarian, and 9 as other.
In Study 1c, we recruited 378 participants from the Indiana undergraduate subject pool.
317 of these participants passed experimental manipulation checks and were included in all
subsequent analyses. According to participant demographic responses, 188 were female,
125 male, and 4 participant selected other. There were 39 Asian participants, 25 Black or
African American participants, 21 Hispanic or Latino participants, 213 White participants,
15 participants who selected More than one, and 4 participants who selected Unknown.
Twenty participants identified as very liberal, 81 as liberal, 61 as slightly liberal, 61 as
moderate/middle of the road, 33 as slightly conservative, 21 as conservative, 2 as very
conservative, 30 as don’t know/not political, 5 as libertarian, and 3 as other.
Design
The studies in this manuscript utilize a set of actions initially reported in Celestin and
Kruschke (2019a, 2019b). These actions are representative of the full range of plausible
actions in the context of police-civilian encounters. The research of Celestin and Kruschke
(2019a, 2019b) derived precise scale estimates for the moral and physical severities of the
actions.
Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c were all constructed using the same set of actions used by
Celestin and Kruschke (2019a, 2019b), but each study asked participants to respond to
a different prompt. In the design, participants were presented with a decontextualized vi-
gnette:
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While working a patrol shift, a police officer was dispatched to a reported
crime, and in the course of the investigation, he came into contact with a civil-
ian. During their subsequent interaction...
During the first block of all three studies, participants were presented with each civilian
action at the end of the vignette and the full set of 22 officer actions. Participants were asked
to choose an officer action according to the prompt. Civilian actions were highlighted in
bold font to maximize ease of comprehension, and prompts were italicized. See Figure 19
for an example. Each civilian action was presented in a randomized order. Thus, from
a participant’s perspective, every screen displayed a complete vignette that included one
civilian action and required the selection of one officer response. Four manipulation check
questions were randomly inserted in order to test whether participants were responding
thoughtfully. These check questions asked participants to select either the very first or very
last action in order to calibrate the survey.
In studies 1a, and 1b, a subsequent block presented the same vignette but included
an officer rather than a civilian action appended to each vignette. This subsequent block
instructed participants to choose a civilian action that "makes the officer action an appropri-
ate response." Although originally intended as an inverse framing of the first experimental
block, highly variable responses indicated that this second block was challenging for par-
ticipants to interpret. For this reason, the second block was removed from Study 1c and is
not discussed further here (but see the supplementary material for analyses of the second
block data).
Procedure
Following informed consent and initial instructions, participants were presented with
a screen formatted similarly to the experiment accompanied by instructions for resizing
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Figure 19. Screenshot from Study 1a.
the screen. Participants were asked to affirm complete visibility of the content in order
to ensure that the vignette and all of the actions were simultaneously visible. Participants
were then provided with the following instructions:
On the following screens, you will be presented with scenarios that represent
real life interactions involving police officers and civilians. Officer and civil-
ian names have been purposefully excluded. For each scenario, you will be
presented with a civilian action and asked to select an officer action. Please
be sure to read everything carefully as you go because the civilian actions will
change each time. There are no right or wrong answers; we would like your
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intuitive, thoughtful responses.
For Study 1a, participants were then advised "For this set of scenarios, please choose
the most appropriate officer response (assuming he is able)". For Study 1b, they were ad-
vised "Please choose the most severe but still appropriate and not excessive officer action
(assuming he is able)". For Study 1c, they were advised "Please choose what you think an
officer would do (assuming he is able, and regardless of what you think is the most appro-
priate officer response)". Thus, Study 1a was intended to measure participant perceptions
of the most appropriate officer response, Study 1b the most extreme but still appropriate
officer response, and Study 1c the action that participants believe an officer would actually
choose.
Participants were then presented with each vignette and asked to respond to the asso-
ciated prompt by choosing an action. If the action that a participant selected had a latent
severity difference greater than 1 (i.e., 20% of the range of the severity scale) (Celestin &
Kruschke, 2019a), a warning message was presented in red advising the following:
Are you certain this is the action you want to choose? Please double check,
and when you’re sure, click "Submit Answer" again to confirm your choice.
This warning message was only displayed one time, and participants were allowed to pro-
ceed without changing their selection if they chose to do so. The purpose of this warning
flag were to encourage thoughtful responding and to discourage selecting actions randomly
as a method to complete the experiment faster.
Following these experimental blocks, participants answered six questions assessing
their felt obligation to obey police and their personal alignment with police values us-
ing a slider. They also answered binary questions about personal and vicarious negative
experiences. Finally, participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire and were
debriefed.
92
SOLOF
Level Civilian Action (presented) Officer Action (selected)
1 stood near the officer stand near the civilian
1 asked the officer how he was doing ask the civilian how he is doing
1 waved at the officer in greeting wave at the civilian in greeting
2 yelled "get back!" at the officer yell "get back!" at the civilian
2
shouted "I don’t have to fucking
listen to you!" at the officer
shout "get your fucking
hands up!" at the civilian
2
said "if you touch me,
you’re gonna get hurt" to the officer
say "if you touch me,
you’re gonna get hurt" to the civilian
2 called the officer a pig call the civilian a thug
3 pulled away from the officer put handcuffs on the civilian
3 sprayed the officer with pepper spray spray the civilian with pepper spray
3 shocked the officer with a tazer shock the civilian with a tazer
3
twisted the arm of the officer,
forcing him to the ground
twist the arm of the civilian,
forcing him to the ground
4 punched the officer in the face punch the civilian in the face
4 kicked the officer in the stomach kick the civilian in the stomach
4 applied a chokehold to the officer apply a chokehold to the civilian
5 headbutted the officer in the face headbutt the civilian in the face
5
struck the officer on the leg with a
metal pipe
strike the civilian on the leg with a
collapsible baton
5
hit the officer in the chest with a
baseball bat
shoot the civilian in the chest
with a beanbag shotgun round
5
struck the officer in the stomach
with a metal flashlight
strike the civilian in the stomach
with a metal flashlight
6 shot the officer in the chest with a handgun shoot the civilian in the chest with a handgun
6 shot the officer in the head with a handgun shoot the civilian in the head with a handgun
6
slammed the officer’s head into the
concrete curb
slam the civilian’s head into the
concrete curb
6
purposefully struck the officer with a
motor vehicle
purposefully strike the civilian with a
motor vehicle
Figure 20. Civilian and officer actions used in studies 1a, 1b, and 1c.
Results
Study 1a
Figure 21 plots the frequency with which participants selected each officer action (plot-
ted on the vertical axis) relative to each civilian action that was presented (plotted on the
horizontal axis). The total frequency with which each officer action was chosen across all
civilian actions is plotted using squares in the right margin. In particular, the larger the
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Figure 21. Frequency counts of participant action selection of the “most appropriate offi-
cer response” (Study 1a). Actions are color coded according to officer SOLOF level (see
Figure 20). Marginal squares represent the total frequency with which each officer action
was selected and are sized accordingly. All actions on both vertical and horizontal axes are
spaced at equal intervals.
circle or square relative to the others, the more frequently participants selected that action.
Both officer and civilian actions are plotted at equal intervals from one another, and they are
plotted in ascending order of their latent severity estimates (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a).
A diagonal dashed line is also visible as a reference for proportionality between officer and
civilian action severity.
One pattern that is visible in the marginal squares is that participants chose lower sever-
ity actions with much greater frequency than higher severity actions. Moreover, several of-
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ficer actions were commonly chosen across a wide range of civilian actions; these include
handcuffing, armbar, and tazer (see Figure 20 for full action descriptions). These actions
correspond to the most normative actions measured in Study 2 (see Figures 27 and 28).
Conversely, some actions such as nameCall, headSlam, and punchFace were selected very
infrequently. These actions correspond to non-normative actions measured in Study 2.
Overall, the pattern of responses indicates a large portion of the actions selected fall be-
low the line of proportionality. This suggests that participants are most frequently selecting
officer actions that are less severe than civilian actions as the "most appropriate" response.
Figure 22. The information presented here is the same as in Figure 21 (Study 1a). However,
the actions on the vertical and horizontal axes are plotted at their latent moral severities for
officer and civilian, respectively (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a).
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Figure 21 is useful for displaying the data for all possible action pairs while minimiz-
ing visible overlap, but it is somewhat misleading due to the equal spacing of the actions
on the axes. Placing actions at equal intervals is problematic because our prior research
demonstrates that the underlying moral and physical severities of this set of actions is quite
different from a standard force "continuum" that might organize them in that manner (i.e.,
equidistantly). Thus, Figure 22 plots the same information as Figure 21 but with the officer
and civilian actions shifted to their respective latent moral severity estimates on the vertical
and horizontal axes (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a).
In Figure 22, it can be seen that officer actions at extreme levels (low and high) are
selected in proportion to civilian severity to some degree; but for all of the verbal and non-
lethal actions, participants are very clearly selecting officer actions that are less severe than
the civilian actions they are confronting.
Study 1b
The prompt for Study 1a solicits general judgments of the most appropriate action. To
the extent that action appropriateness is normally distributed with excessive actions in the
high tail and insufficient actions in the low tail, the “most appropriate” prompt is likely
extracting action choices from the peak of the distribution. However, it is possible that
some actions on the excessive side of the distribution would still be evaluated as appropriate
as a holistic lay judgment, even if they are not the “most appropriate” choice. That is, it
could be the case that more extreme officer actions that are largely proportional to civilian
severity might still be deemed appropriate. For this reason, the prompt for Study 1b asked
participants to select the “most severe but still appropriate and not excessive” officer action.
This prompt is more specific than the prompt in Study 1a and was intended to measure the
most extreme officer action that was still morally justified relative to each civilian action in
the minds of participants.
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Figure 23. Frequency counts of participant action selection of the “most severe but still
appropriate and not excessive” officer action (Study 1b). Actions on the vertical and hor-
izontal axes are plotted at their latent moral severities for officer and civilian, respectively
(Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a).
As in Figure 22, Figure 23 plots the frequency of each officer action selected by par-
ticipants at their relative latent action severities on the vertical and horizontal axes. Visual
inspection reveals that the individual and marginal frequencies have shifted up vertically,
indicating that participants did tend to choose more severe actions than in Study 1a. Lethal
actions were chosen more frequently and are more proportionately distributed around the
diagonal line. However, despite the tendency to choose more severe officer actions, the
bulk of non-lethal and verbal actions still fall below the diagonal line. This suggests that
even the most extreme officer actions that are still perceived as morally acceptable are less
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severe than the civilian force confronting the officer.
Study 1c
Studies 1a and 1b assessed participant choices for what they believed an officer should
do. But these prescriptive prompts raised the question of whether what participants thought
an officer should do differs from what they believe an officer would actually do when
confronted with a specific civilian action. To assess what participants thought an officer
would actually do, Study 1c prompted participants to "choose what you think an officer
would do (assuming he is able, and regardless of what you think is the most appropriate
officer response)".
As before, Figure 24 plots the frequency counts of the officer actions participants se-
lected, and the vertical and horizontal axes are plotted at their respective latent severity
estimates (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a). Visual inspection of Figure 24 indicates that it
looks much more like Figure 23 than Figure 22. That is, lethal officer actions are relatively
proportionate, and the bulk of the actions are shifted up slightly indicating participants are
choosing somewhat more severe actions. However, as in both Figure 22 and Figure 23, the
bulk of non-lethal and verbal actions fall below the diagonal line. One possible explanation
is that participants are generally expecting officers to use the most severe level of force
that is legally justified (as they interpreted Study 1b’s prompt). Another possibility is that
the "would do" question is weird or otherwise hard for participants to think about, but this
explanation does not seem likely as the prompt is rationally straightforward and participant
responses were consistent and reasonable (i.e., did not exhibit signs of random responding).
Thus, we interpret these results as indicating that participant’s prescriptive judgments
about what police should do when confronted with civilian resistance are quite similar to
their descriptive judgments of what they believe officers would actually do. That is, it seems
that participants generally believe that police officers will choose forceful actions that are
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Figure 24. Frequency counts of participant action selection for what an officer “would
do (assuming he is able, and regardless of what you think is the most appropriate officer
response)”. Actions on the vertical and horizontal axes are plotted at their latent moral
severities for officer and civilian, respectively (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a).
slightly more severe than those they view as most appropriate, but still within participant’s
range of acceptable actions which tend to be less severe than civilian resistance.
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Extracting action normativities from inferential models
Further analyses of the data from Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c are planned. In particular, an
inferential model using a skew-normal noise distribution offers the potential to extract the
role-normativity of the actions for police. The model, in progress, describes the chosen
officer action as a linear or quadratic trend of the civilian action severity, weighted by the
normativity of the officer action. These normativities are estimated in the model and should
correlate with the normativities estimated in (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a).
Method: Study 2
Study 2 was designed to directly assay the normative strength of association between
all 27 actions initially reported in Celestin and Kruschke (2019a). It was comprised of
two components that were both administered to every subject, resulting in a fully crossed
within-subjects design.
Participants
For Study 2, we recruited 426 participants from the Indiana undergraduate subject pool.
399 of these participants passed experimental manipulation checks and were included in all
subsequent analyses. According to participant demographic responses, 267 were female,
130 male, and 2 participant selected other. There were 3 American Indian/Alaska Native
participant, 55 Asian participants, 26 Black or African American participants, 18 Hispanic
or Latino participants, 280 White participants, and 17 participants who selected More than
one. Forty participants identified as very liberal, 90 as liberal, 51 as slightly liberal, 69
as moderate/middle of the road, 38 as slightly conservative, 32 as conservative, 9 as very
conservative, 63 as don’t know/not political, 2 as libertarian, and 5 as other.
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Design
The experimental paradigm consisted of two blocks: An explicit ratings block and
an implicit reaction time block. In the first block (the explicit task), participants were
presented with each of the 27 actions described in Figure 20 (i.e., 17 actions that are exactly
the same for the officer and civilian, plus 5 unique officer actions and 5 unique civilian
actions of matching severity) in a random order. Rather than explicitly describing who was
performing the action as we have in prior paradigms, we used generic roles of "Person A"
and "Person B" to describe the actors. Actions were presented one at a time (i.e., one per
screen) and participants were asked to respond to the prompt "How likely is it that Person
A is a police officer?". Person A always represented the actor, while Person B represented
the person being acted upon. Participants responded using a sliding scale ranging from 0
to 100 and labeled in increments of 10, with the 0 endpoint also anchored as "Not Likely"
and the 100 endpoint also anchored as "Very Likely". See Figure 25 for a screenshot of the
first experimental block. Additionally, three manipulation check questions were randomly
Figure 25. Screenshot from the first block of Study 2.
inserted to allow us to gauge thoughtless responding post-hoc. These check questions
advised participants to set the slider to one extreme or the other, with the specific requested
endpoint randomly selected across trials.
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In the second block (the implicit task), participants were asked to familiarize themselves
with a list of 12 possible and 12 impossible actions, and then rapidly categorize them as
possible or impossible for either a police officer or criminal. The 12 possible actions were
culled from the larger list in Figure 20. Specifically, we chose actions that were all physical
and also exhibited highly disproportionate or proportionate severity (Celestin & Kruschke,
2019a). Selecting a subset of actions was necessary in order to keep the total number
of trials manageable, and our intention was to test the most proportionate relative to the
most disproportionate actions in our original set. Whether participants first categorized
actions for an officer or criminal was randomly assigned across participants, but all actions
were categorized for one role at a time. The same 12 possible actions were presented
to every participant. However, we generated a larger list of 36 impossible actions and
randomly selected 12 of them to match our 12 possible actions for each participant. The
primary reason for sampling from this larger set of impossible actions was to ensure that
any idiosyncratic impossible action would not unduly influence our results. Knowing that
our primary dependent measure for this implicit task was reaction time, we took great care
to ensure that the character length and number of syllables across our lists of possible and
impossible actions were matched as closely as was feasible. Table 5 presents all of the
possible and impossible actions.
During the task itself, participants were presented with the prompt "Is this something
that is possible for [a criminal | a police officer] to do? (Please press "P" or "I")", accompa-
nied by the action in bold font. For each trial, the action was preceded by a 400 millisecond
prime that displayed the role (i.e., either police or criminal) which was replaced with the
action when the prime duration expired. A 500 millisecond inter-trial interval was also used
between each trial. Instructions at the bottom of the screen advised that a red X would ap-
pear if the wrong response was selected and that the correct key must be pressed to proceed.
A screenshot of the experiment is presented in Figure 26.
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Table 5
Table of possible and impossible actions.
Possible Actions Impossible Actions
yell "get back!" rip arms off
call thug grow claws
apply handcuffs become vampire
use a tazer cast spell
twist someone’s arm use "the force"
choke hold fly away
headbutt walk on water
baton strike leg summon zombie
hit with bat control weather
shoot in chest become invisible
slam head on curb use telepathy
hit with car become giant
– channel lightning
– become immortal
– regrow a limb
– walk through wall
– breathe fire
– teleport
– travel back in time
– become liquid
– dimension travel
– become dragon
– lightsaber
– catch bullet
– punch in half
– raise dead
– frozen touch
– destroy soul
– read minds
– become younger
– become stone
– x-ray vision
– summon demon
– bulletproof skin
– laser eye rays
– grow wings
All 12 possible actions were presented to every participant, but 12 impossi-
ble actions were randomly selected from the full list of 36 for each participant.
Procedure
Following informed consent, participants were provided with the following instruc-
tions:
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Figure 26. Screenshot of the sequence of an impossible action trial for the implicit task of
Study 2. The final panel in the sequence represents the screen presented to participants if
they select the incorrect response.
On the following screens, you will be presented with different actions that are
described as being performed by Person A on Person B. For each action, you
will be asked to rate how likely it is that Person A is a police officer from 0 =
’Not Likely’ to 100 = ’Very Likely’. There are no right or wrong answers, but
please respond thoughtfully.
Participants were then presented with the following instructions:
In a moment, you will be asked to rapidly categorize actions according to
whether or not it is possible for someone in a given role to perform them.
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Some of the actions are possible (e.g., headbutting someone), while others are
impossible (e.g., breathing fire)
They were then presented with a list of possible and impossible actions and asked to famil-
iarize themselves with the actions. These instructions were intended to mitigate participant
confusion and ensure clarity regarding which actions are possible and which are impossible
(though we chose the actions to maximize their apparent impossibility). Participants were
specifically instructed, "For each action, you will be asked whether it is something that [a
criminal|a police officer] could do (i.e., whether it is possible or impossible)." They were
instructed to press the "P" key with their left index finger for possible actions and the "I" key
with their right index finger for impossible actions. Finally, we reinforced the importance of
responding thoughtfully, but also as quickly and accurately as possible. Participants were
then presented with the block of trials for the officer and criminal in a random order. Each
possible and impossible action was presented to participants four times. Thus, the total
number of action trials for police primes/prompts was 96, and for criminal primes/prompts
was also 96, for a total of 192 trials. In order to minimize participant fatigue, breaks were
inserted every 48 trials. During these breaks, participants were instructed to take a mo-
ment to rest and, when ready, place their index fingers on the "P" and "I" keys and press
the spacebar to continue. Responding as quickly as possible was also re-emphasized at
the conclusion of the breaks. At the conclusion of the experimental blocks, participants
responded to the same measures of legitimacy beliefs and demographics as in Studies 1a,
1b, and 1c, and debriefed.
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Results
Explicit Task
We modeled the likelihood ratings of Person A being a police officer by estimating a
mean and standard deviation of rating for each action using Bayesian estimation. Ratings
were described as a function of each action, allowing every action to have its own variability
parameter. Because responses for some of the actions piled at the extremes of the scale,
indicating that participants would have responded beyond the scale bounds if allowed, we
treated extreme values greater than 5 and 95 as censored data. Formally, the model states
y ∼ dnorm(µa, σa) (5)
where y represents a rating, and a indexes each action. The µ parameter is an estimated
coefficient for the corresponding action, and the σ parameter an estimated coefficient for
the noise distribution around each β. There was no hierarchical structure imposed on the
µa or σa parameters. Priors for all estimated parameters were diffuse relative to the scale
of the data, so they had negligible influence on the resulting posterior estimates.
Figure 27 displays the modal estimates and highest density intervals (HDIs) for each
action. Actions are ordered on the horizontal axis from least to greatest, and the vertical
axis represents the likelihood that Person A is a police officer. Actions are also color-
coded according to their categorization a priori into a six-level force continuum (Celestin
& Kruschke, 2019a).
Visual inspection of Figure 27 reveals that actions across all continuum categories are
distributed over the likelihood range. That is, it is not the case that more severe actions
are perceived systematically as more likely to be performed by a police officer, or vice
versa for less severe actions. Additionally, there is wide variability in the degree to which
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Figure 27. Mode and HDI estimates for each action in the explicit task. Actions are ordered
by mode, and color-coded according to their a priori force continuum category (Celestin &
Kruschke, 2019a).
a given action is likely to be performed by a police officer. For some actions, such as
calling someone a “pig”, hitting someone with a baseball bat, or striking someone with a
vehicle, participants rated the likelihood that the actor is a police officer as very low. For
other actions, such as twisting someone’s arm, tazing someone, or handcuffing someone,
participants rated the likelihood that the actor is a police officer as very high. Actions of
middling likelihood reflect those that are perceived to be roughly equally likely to involve
a police actor or an actor who is not a police officer. As we anticipated, the actions at the
extreme levels of likelihood correspond to those that exhibit non-monotonicities of moral
relative to physical severity in our prior research (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a).
In order to directly compare the ratings of likelihood that Person A is a police officer
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Figure 28
with the non-monotonicities observed in the moral and physical severity scales we derived
previously, we first fit a least-squares linear regression model predicting the moral severity
estimates as a function of the force severity estimates. This approach allowed us to quantify
the non-monotonicities using a linear model that best fit all of the data points (i.e., all of the
action scale estimates) together. From this model, we extracted the residuals which repre-
sent the non-normativity of each action. That is, positive residual values indicate actions
with scale values that are more morally than physically severe, while negative residual val-
ues reflect actions with scale values that are more physically than morally severe. Residual
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values that are close to 0 indicate actions whose moral and physical severity scale values
are approximately proportionate.
Figure 28 plots these residual values on the vertical axis, and the predicted probability
that Person A is a police officer on the horizontal axis. The correlation between residuals
and predicted probability is −0.78, indicating that as actions become more likely to have
been performed by a police officer, the residuals move from positive to negative. In other
words, actions that are highly non-normative (i.e., have relatively large positive residuals)
are also rated as very unlikely to have been performed by a police officer, while actions that
are highly normative (i.e., have relatively large negative residuals) are rated as quite likely
to have been performed by a police officer.
Implicit Task
To analyze the reaction time (i.e., implicit task) data, we first extracted the response tri-
als, excluding the primes and inter-trial intervals. Subsequently, we removed all trials that
had reaction times greater than 2500milliseconds or less than 200milliseconds, as these tri-
als were very uncommon and indicative of erroneous responses. Commonly, reaction time
data exhibit skewed distributions, and our data were no exception. For this reason, we log
transformed all response times jointly which yielded a distribution that was approximately
normal. The primary actions of interest for the purposes of the current analysis were the
possible actions because we were interested in evaluating reaction time differences between
those actions for the criminal relative to the police prime. For this reason, we excluded the
impossible actions and analyzed the possible actions in isolation.
We modeled these cleaned and transformed data using Bayesian regression. Formally,
the model was specified as
yˆ = β0 + βa + βr + βa×r + σa (6)
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where yˆ represents the predicted value of a response time. The β0 regression coefficient
represents the baseline response time, the βa coefficients represent the response time de-
flections for each action from baseline across roles, the βr coefficient represents the re-
sponse time deflection from one role to the other across actions, and the βa×r coefficients
represent the response time deflections for one role and each action relative to the corre-
sponding action for the other role (i.e., the interaction of action and role). As indicated by
the subscript, the model also allowed a separate σa for each action. In essence, this model
estimates a mean for each action × role combination.
Figure 29. Log reaction times for the 12 possible actions.
Figure 29 plots the reaction time model predictions and 95% highest density intervals
(HDIs) from equation 6. Actions are plotted on the horizontal axis, and log reaction time is
plotted on the vertical axis. Criminal and police roles are differentiated by point (circle for
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criminal, triangle for police) and color (red for criminal, blue for police). Examining the
pattern displayed reveals that some actions (e.g., twist someone’s arm) did exhibit slower
reaction times than others (e.g., headbutt) collapsing across police and criminal prime con-
ditions. Moreover, a few of the actions also exhibit differences in the predicted direction
for criminals relative to police. In particular, “apply handcuffs” and “use a tazer” demon-
strate faster reaction times for police relative to criminals indicating that they are more
strongly associated with police. Overall, however, the observed differences between police
and criminal across all actions are negligible which is reflected in very small or zero es-
timates for the βa, βr, and βa×r coefficients in the model. To follow up on these results,
we ran frequentist models that correspond to equation 6 using the raw response times as
the predicted values and observed that the average difference in response time between
different role/action combinations was approximately 26 milliseconds, while the average
standard deviation across those combinations was approximately 300 milliseconds. Thus,
the reaction time data we have appear to be much too noisy to adequately measure the small
effects between role/action pairs that we attempted at the level of individual actions.
However, in order to assess the relationship of the overall pattern of the possible re-
action time differences with the moral and physical severity discrepancies observed in
Celestin and Kruschke (2019a), we conducted an additional analysis that is depicted in
Figure 30. Specifically, we calculated the estimated reaction time difference for criminal
relative to police prime for each possible action and then calculated the correlation be-
tween those difference values and the moral/physical residual discrepancies. As shown
in Figure 30, there was a negative correlation of −0.56 indicating that actions exhibiting
slower reaction times for criminal relative to police primes (i.e., those that demonstrate
stronger association with police) tended to have greater latent physical than moral severity.
Conversely, actions that had slower reaction times for police relative to criminal primes
tended to have greater latent moral relative to physical severity. Visual inspection of Fig-
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Figure 30. The reaction time difference for criminal prime minus police prime is plotted on
the horizontal axis, while the residuals from a linear model of moral severity as a function
of physical severity (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a) are plotted on the vertical axis.
ure 30 indicates that, although this correlation is of reasonable magnitude, it is driven by
only a few data points (e.g., tazer). Moreover, some of the actions that were anticipated
to show a stronger police association have slightly slower reaction times for police than
criminal primes (e.g., handgunChest and batonLeg). Taking these observations into ac-
count means that, although this correlation does offer support for the overall relationship
between normative association and moral severity perceptions, these reaction time data are
very noisy, and so conclusions must be tentative. Thus, the current reaction time data can
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only contribute modest additional information about the strength of association between
our possible actions and police relative to criminals. Future iterations of this task should
keep the limitations of our reaction time data in mind when modifying our task or designing
a new task to measure these associations.
Discussion
The current studies directly assessed lay perceptions of appropriate police responses to
civilian resistance in the context of previously derived severity scale estimates. They also
measured the extent to which specific actions are more or less uniquely associated with
police to explain discrepancies in perceived moral relative to physical severity.
Study 1a demonstrated that lay evaluators generally tend to select officer actions that
are less severe than the civilian action with which they are confronted. Study 1b focused
participant responses on the most extreme but still acceptable officer responses, and con-
firmed that even the most extreme allowable actions still tend to be less severe than civilian
resistance. These results stand in stark contrast to the general heuristic rule that police
agencies use allowing them to use force that is greater than (i.e., one level above) civilian
action severity (Garner et al., 1995; Terrill & Paoline, 2013). Like most aspects of use-
of-force policy, the heuristic rules that law enforcement use were not chosen frivolously,
and there are good reasons to be hesitant to alter them to match citizen expectations. The
supreme court in United States treat the legal evaluation of use of force as something that
must be done by someone with expertise (i.e., by an officer with similar training and expe-
rience, without the benefit of hindsight (Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 1985; Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 3, 1989)), and it is evident that police require sufficient discretion to
make choices about use of force that maximize personal and bystander safety and also the
probability of subject compliance. Nevertheless, it is clear from our data that police and
civilians have quite different expectations and are, in a sense, speaking different languages
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about what constitutes appropriate use of force.
Rather than assessing lay evaluations of what officers should do, Study 1c measured
what participants thought officers would actually do when confronted with different levels
of civilian force. These results appear very similar to the most extreme actions that are
still morally acceptable measured in Study 1b, but they still indicate participants are ex-
pecting that officers would actually select less severe actions than civilians. This finding
may reflect the extent to which civilian and police expectations are descriptively as well as
prescriptively disconnected. That is, it does not seem to be the case the civilian evaluators
understand that police are trained to use more force than they are confronting but disagree
with that training (i.e., a largely moral disagreement). Rather, lay evaluators believe that
the most appropriate police responses to civilian resistance are less severe than said re-
sistance, and that police would actually select less severe actions in real life, which is a
more fundamentally knowledge-based misunderstanding. This is a profound discrepancy,
but it also suggests a hopeful counterpoint: if the public is largely ill informed about po-
lice training and the reasons underlying the structure of force continua and accompanying
heuristic rules, it seems likely that educational outreach efforts aimed at broadening citizen
knowledge about these issues and the rationale underlying law enforcement policies holds
promise for uniting police and civilian perspectives. Moral disagreements can be particu-
larly intractable, so it could be especially challenging (though not impossible) to facilitate
alignment of police and citizen evaluations of use of force if citizens believe police should
act one way but would actually act in another. Given that our participants underestimate the
severity of actual police responses relative to policy recommendations, it seems possible
that mere exposure to those policy recommendations could ameliorate some of the conflict
in the current national discourse about police use of force.
Study 2 assessed the normativity of actions in relation to the strength of their associ-
ation with police. In particular, the explicit task presented participants with each action
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and inquired about the probability that the actor was a police officer, while the subsequent
implicit task assessed reaction time differences for categorizing actions following primes
of police or criminal groups. The explicit task revealed clear differences between the extent
to which particular actions are associated with police. Some actions were very unlikely to
indicate that the actor was a police officer, while others were highly likely to mean that
the actor was a police officer. Moreover, the correlation between the likelihood that an ac-
tion was a strong signal for police and the discrepancy between moral and physical action
severities previously measured (Celestin & Kruschke, 2019a) was strongly negative. Addi-
tionally, although the reaction time measure of implicit associations was too noisy to yield
useful data at the level of individual actions, the overall correlation of reaction time dif-
ferences and moral/physical action severities supported the general pattern observed in the
explicit ratings. Taken together, these results provide direct evidence that some actions are
strongly and, perhaps, uniquely associated with police, and that those actions alter moral
judgments of severity relative to the perceived physical magnitude of force. Conversely, the
results also indicate that actions that are not associated with police are more likely to yield
moral judgments that are especially severe. Because our paradigms are decontextualized to
mimic the structure of official policies, these effects are occurring at the level of the actions
themselves, independently of other details that might systematically alter judgments. Thus,
these normativity effects are an important additional variable to consider by stakeholders
working at all levels of criminal justice and criminal justice reform.
Because police can only function effectively when they are broadly supported by the
public (Friedman, 2017), these findings suggest an important and potentially overlooked
consideration that agencies and academics could focus on to develop educational materials
and methods and policy recommendations. Namely, it is worth paying attention to the
perceived normativity of actions, and even choosing maximally normative force options if
all other outcomes are likely to be equal.
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In sum, the studies we report indicate that public evaluations of police use of force
are disconnected from the decision-making tools and heuristics that law enforcement in
the United States routinely use to make decisions on the streets. Citizens are expecting
police to act in ways that highly role-normative using actions that are generally less severe
than those they are confronting. Meanwhile, it is common knowledge among police that
appropriate, legally justified police actions can and often should be of higher severity than
civilian resistance in order to maximize safety and quickly achieve compliance. Police are
also instructed (at least indirectly) that action legitimacy does not depend on normativity—
especially in the case of lethal force(Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 1985; Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 3, 1989). The first step toward ameliorating police-civilian conflict
regarding the morality of specific instances of use of force is precisely identifying where
conflict exists, and so we are hopeful that the findings we present here can initiate useful
convergence of police and civilian perspectives that will mutually benefit both groups.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
The studies presented in this dissertation measured lay perceptions of police and civil-
ian use of force using novel paradigms that allow direct comparison to the force contin-
uum structure and "one above" heuristic rule that are commonly used by law enforcement
to make decisions about appropriate force. Globally, these results provide evidence that
citizen perceptions are substantively different from law enforcement evaluation strategies
and tools. Lay evaluators do not seem to meaningfully distinguish the severity of actions
that are non-lethal but physically forceful, unlike the nuanced structure and fine gradations
that police impose on these actions. Conversely, lay evaluators seem to view verbal and
lethal actions with considerably more nuance than police, who bundle these actions into
one respective force category (i.e., one for verbal and one for lethal), and who evaluate the
justifiability of all lethal actions in a binary (i.e., justified or not justified) manner.
Lay evaluators also tend to rate police and civilian actions of increasing severity as more
forceful and excessive, as well as less acceptable and more deserving of punishment, but
there are marked differences in the judgments of individuals who view the police as highly
legitimate authorities compared to those who do not. High-legitimacy individuals view
more severe police actions as somewhat justified in response to sufficiently severe civilian
actions, but low-legitimacy individuals appear reluctant to judge severe police actions as
justified, even when civilian actions are also severe. Moreover, low-legitimacy individuals
tend to perceive lethal civilian actions as somewhat acceptable and much less deserving of
punishment when police actions are also severe, while high-legitimacy individuals never
endorse severe civilian actions.
When asked to select appropriate police responses to civilian violence, lay evaluators
overwhelmingly choose actions that are less severe than those confronting officers, even
when they are asked to choose the most extreme action that would still be justified. Further-
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more, when selecting actions that they believe police would actually choose (irrespective of
what seems appropriate), lay evaluators still select actions that are less severe than civilian
resistance. In ambiguous scenarios, the strength of association between specific actions and
police varies considerably, demonstrating that some actions are highly role-normative for
police, while others are highly non-normative. The non-normative actions are strongly cor-
related with increased moral severity perceptions, while normative actions are associated
with decreased moral severity.
Taken together these results demonstrate that lay observers and police officers are rou-
tinely speaking different languages when they evaluate instances of police and civilian use
of force. It is true that, in some ways, these results demonstrate alignment between lay
intuitions and police policy; like force continua, lay moral judgments of police actions de-
pend on the severity of civilian actions, and vice versa. And so, at a very coarse level, there
is overlap between lay and professional assessments that bolsters justification for the broad
organization of actions along some continuum of severity. However, police commonly par-
cel non-lethal force into three increasingly severe categories that are practically invisible
to a lay audience, and the expectations of lay people for police to use less force than civil-
ian resistance stand in stark contrast to the "one-level-above" heuristic that guides police
choices. These differences help to explain why people reading the same news stories or
watching the same videos of violent interactions between police and civilians often come
to starkly different conclusions than police or even the decisions that are ultimately handed
down by the courts.
In the limit, moral evaluations of police and civilian violence are just a special case of
moral evaluations generally. That is, the same psychological processes are operating when
human beings evaluate forceful actions in the context of a police-civilian encounter that
are operating when they evaluate any other morally charged situation—especially those
in which there are potentially aversive tradeoffs that must be resolved in the moment but
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are psychologically problematic to think about (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner,
2000; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005). In some ways, police use of physical force is analo-
gous to surgery; both require incurring some level of localized physical damage but with
the end goal of mitigating greater global harm, and both must balance high-stakes risks
relative to rewards under considerable time and resource constraints. In addition, it is un-
clear whether lay individuals observing two different surgeries—one in which surgeons
used current best-practices and one in which they were negligent and potentially guilty of
malpractice—could reliably distinguish between them, perhaps, in part, because the vis-
ceral experience of observing any surgery tends evoke unpleasant and unsettling feelings
for many people. Likewise, the application of justifiable versus criminal violence by police
may be challenging for lay observers to disintegrate for similar reasons, and the selection
and training processes that separate police and surgeons from lay audiences may represent
a kind of fundamental difference in constitution and/or expertise that cannot be easily over-
come. On the other hand, policing in the U.S. has a tragic history of enforcing the will of
the majority against the minority in ways that are now rightly judged as unfair and cruel
(Leovy, 2015), and police agencies must grapple with this history and with the constant
need to continue to progress toward the goal of impartiality in the application of criminal
justice. In-group dynamics and self-interest affect police officers and agencies just as much
as any other group, and police (as well as surgeons) are rightly held to a very high standard
given the awesome powers that we entrust to them. For these reasons, law enforcement
officers and agencies must be especially vigilant about using violence only when and to
the degree that it is necessary, and they must do so in a way that reduces the influences of
bias as much as possible and takes lay perceptions into adequate account. All of this is to
say that morally evaluating police and civilian use of force is a highly complex endeavor
that is certain to be riddled with high-stakes tradeoffs and intrinsic psychological biases,
and it will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. Lay and professional evaluations
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of force may never fully converge, but the results presented in this dissertation shed new
light on the specific ways that lay perceptions diverge from official models of force, and
they offer insight into mechanisms that might be leveraged to facilitate better alignment of
police and civilian perspectives about what constitutes legitimate use of force. Ultimately,
police can only operate effectively when they are underwritten by broad societal support.
We are hopeful and cautiously confident that the current findings can help unify divergent
perspectives and contribute to more strongly and widely supported policing, and thus to a
more peaceful and just society.
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